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Utilizing an Effective Economic Approach to Family
Court: A Proposal for a Statutory Unified Family Court in
Pennsylvania
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One day we will learn that the heart can never be
totally right if the head is totally wrong. Only through
the bringing together of head and heart-intelligence
and goodness-shallman rise to a fulfillment of his
true nature.'

*
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INTRODUCTION

Does it make good sense to unify the law (the courts, intelligence) with the family (the heart) to understand the true nature of
a family unit therapeutically, consistently, and efficiently? Several
experts agree that a unifying approach to managing family court
issues would better satisfy a family's needs and concerns when
addressed by one judge assigned to each family.
This article explores whether Pennsylvania should implement a
statewide unified family court ("UFC") policy by statute. Pennsylvania currently implements a fragmented family court composed
of specialty courts in the areas of orphans', divorce, domestic relations, domestic abuse, and juvenile law. Juvenile court aims to balance the best interests of the juveniles, their victims and the community. By adopting a UFC policy, Pennsylvania may provide more
benefits to juveniles, families, victims, and society. This article
aims to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a UFC concept and whether this concept is consistent with Pennsylvania's
aim to fund an entire unified judicial system. If so, should a UFC
be the first step in the implementation of this system?
A.

The Business of the Courts

Unifying principles, although new to the courts, are not new to
business. Streamlining monetary and time resources are goals of
effective business management. It is plain old "good economics" to
bring together many convenient opportunities for the consumers
to shop, for instance. Big business means that supermarkets now
must include more than food specialty departments; they should
also have pharmacies, florist stands, greeting cards, laundries,
best-selling books, and video stands. "One-stop convenient shopping" are the buzzwords for success.
Courts may need to follow this lead of successful supermarkets
and fulfill the need for more convenient and more consistent service in family court.2 This need has prompted several states with
multi-judge jurisdictions to adopt the UFC as a "one judge-one
family" concept to provide a more efficient and family-friendly
court.3 A UFC aims to consolidate various family court issues re2. Patricia P. Barnes, It May Take a Village... or a Specialized Court to Address
Family Problems, A. B. A. J., Dec. 1996, at 22.
3. Michael A. Town, The Unified Family and Juvenile Court: Quality Justice for
America's Families and Children (December 9, 1994) (unpublished); Andrew Schepard,
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garding support, custody, divorce, termination of parental rights,
delinquency, dependency, adoption, guardianships, and estates.
one judge, with a complement of mediators, psychologists, and
social scientists, for instance, is assigned to a given family for a
length of time to hear all of the family-related issues mentioned
above.4 As a family court concept, "one judge-one family" focuses
on conserving time and money for all stakeholders in the family
court process, especially the children, and provides an avenue of
convenience and efficiency for all parties who appear before the
court.5
Management of time, money, and other resources is crucial to
the success of court programs.6 Currently, in most jurisdictions, a
child's family could appear in front of as many as eight judges for
different issues. No one benefits from such an approach. The judge
does not obtain a full picture of the child and family, and the family
is not provided a consistent decision-making process because of
the change in judges.7
All of these various family court actions have interrelated wombto-tomb issues (from adoptions to decedents' estates). Consolidating these issues before one judge provides a holistic approach to
legal problems faced by families. This can also be very
therapeutic. 8 Offering the advantage of a single, convenient location, a UFC is similar to the management approach found in retail
businesses, in which large and inclusive modem supermarket
structures offer flowers for a funeral and Pampers for twins available in one convenient forum. 9
B. The Development of the UFC Concept
The UFC concept is praised by The National Center of State
Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia-" Endorsed by the American Bar
Association, The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, and, most recently, the United States House of Delegates,
Introductionto the Unified Family Courts, 3 N.Y.L. J., April 16, 1997, at 3.
4. LINDA I. SZYMANSKI, ET AL., POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND CURRENT COURT PRACTICE
IN THE SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS OF JURISDICTION OVER THE FAMILY 5-7 (1992-1993).
5. Robert W. Page, "FamilyCourts" An Effective JudicialApproach to the Resolution of Family Disputes, 44 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 19-21 (1993).
6. Page, supra note 5, at 16-17, 21-22.
7. Id. at 8.
8. Town, supra note 3, at 3; see also Page, supra note 5, at 15.
9. Town, supra note 3.
10. Barnes, supra note 2, at 22.
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the concept of a UFC is not a new phenomenon." This concept
dates to the 1940s, and, in 1961, Rhode Island was the first state to
adopt a UFC on a statewide basis." Five other states have followed this lead, with small local jurisdictions having regional programs of their own in various counties.'3 Recently, the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation of Princeton, New Jersey, approved a
substantial grant for the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Substance Abuse to establish UFC projects in various areas as Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; King County
(Seattle), Washington; and Washington, D.C. 4
Supporters believe this unifying concept developed in part from
the increased awareness that family court-traditionally considered the poor stepchild of the judicial system-is fundamentally
important to the future success of our communities by providing
protection as well as modern-day progress. 5 As we proceed into
the 21st century, with the increase in the number of family court
cases, it becomes clear "the old ways of doing business don't
16
work.'
According to The National Center for State Courts, family court
cases are the largest and fastest growing segment of state court
civil caseloads. In ten years, from 1984 to 1994, the number of domestic relations cases rose by sixty-fiove percent. Family court
cases, including juvenile court cases, constitute more than thirty
percent of the civil docket in state courts. 8 With more federal legislation being enacted to enforce child support awards, the volume
of family court cases has increased, adding to the already-growing
number of juvenile crime cases and the enlarged caseload of neglected and physically abused children.19

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Law:
16.
17.
18.
19.

Barnes, supra note 2, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family
Children'sIssues Take Spotlight,29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 741-742.
Barnes, supra note 2, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Benefits
1. Consistency
Interestingly, the consumers of these court services are repeat
users, whether satisfied consumers or not, who return for more
court services either as a result of being mandated by the court or
by voluntarily initiating their own petitions.2" A study conducted in
1992 by The National Center of the State Courts indicates that
forty percent of the families in family court are repeat consumers
of court services.2 '
The central tenet of the UFC concept is that one highly-trained
judge handles all matters relating to a particular family with the
assistance of support personnel and social service workers. 2 Beyond this common starting point, the model varies from state to
state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 23 A judge's workload with a
particular family can include divorce proceedings, juvenile proceedings, civil commitments, protection orders, and even adult
criminal cases stemming from domestic violence.24 Obviously, this
UFC saves time and money because a judge who knows the history surrounding a family can more effectively and efficiently disan issue than can a judge who is unfamiliar with the
pose of
25
family.
Under the traditional non-integrated model, families often can be
shuttled from one judge to another within the same multi-judge
jurisdiction. 26 Family members, shuffled from court to court, often
have substance abuse problems, which can be latent and not easily
identified by a judge who has had limited contact with a family.
Failure to quickly identify such a core issue may yield more negative results for the family. An example occurs when victims become offenders, finding themselves before other judges unfamiliar
with a family's needs in a disjointed, non-integrated model.27
When the system does not assign the same judge consistently to
a particular family, judges render rulings that fail to address core
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Barnes, supra note 2, at 22.
Schepard, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schepard, supra note 3, at 3.
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problems faced by the family.28 After having been in court on numerous prior occasions, the family ends up more familiar with the
court system and learns to manipulate the system by judge shopping.29
Pro se litigants--and even attorneys-are not expected to carry
the responsibility of giving a full and complete picture of the family
within the limited time assigned to a scheduled case before every
new judge. Court scheduling and the large volume of cases does
not permit such a luxury, even for a new judge. Judges have, as a
result, issued rulings conflicting with decisions made by other
judges within the same jurisdiction regarding the same family.3"
Taxpayers have had to bear the lost opportunity costs of scheduling multiple related actions separately, prolonging and adding to
already heavy caseloads. At the same time, the consumers-the
affected families-must spend limited and scarce resources such
as time and money for assembly line justice from judges faced
with multi-faceted, complex family issues.3"
2. Early Intervention and Prevention
Besides providing consistency, the UFC system emphasizes the
role of early intervention and prevention.32 For instance, in various
districts, because almost one-half of all cases in family court involve substance abuse, a UFC aims to provide treatment at its earliest stage as therapeutic justice to heal the families in need.33 One
jurisdiction that has operated a statewide UFC since 1984 is New
Jersey.34 According to a New Jersey court administrator, although
the new system does save money, the motivation to implement a
UFC is not one of finances, but one of serving families and children.35
3. QualityDecision Making
UFCs make a difference in terms of quality decision making. For
judges, family court can be the most stressful and most difficult
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., at 11.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Schepard, supranote 3,
Barnes, supra note 2, at
Schepard, supranote 3,
Barnes, supra note 2, at

at 11.
23.
at 12; Barnes, supra note 2, at 23.
23.
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assignment. For many judges, case law in this area provides little
direction in their decision-making process. In custody court, for
instance, the Pennsylvania standard for determining primary custody is "the best interests of the child."36 This formula, however,
permits broad judicial discretion based on the judge's own personal experiences and belief and assumes the judge will not abuse
her or his discretion.37 Unlike other areas of the law, where stare
decisis provides direction, custody cases require judges to rely on
their own experiences, either as former practitioners in this field
or as parents in their own family situations, when weighing the
many intangibles associated with these "delicate" issues.38 A
judge's limited, personal experience may not offer enough guidance needed to address the needs of families experiencing many
difficulties.39 With a UFC, more community stakeholders are added
to help the families, such as mediators and court-appointed special
advocates ("CASAs"), who volunteer from within the community
to help the community.
Herein lies the dilemma: What about consumers and their preferences as to the quality of decision making viewed necessary to
have effective and convenient services in family court? We know
that most administrators and judges in a growing number of states
favor "one judge-one family." But what about consumers who may
be "stuck" with a single judge they perceive as unfair? Studies indicate that-just as beauty rests in the eyes of the beholder-the
people's perception of justice is justice. If the court is not perceived as fair and just, then the consumer or litigant who experiences it firsthand will neither value the court nor benefit positively
from interaction with the courts. Although we could have the finest justice system in the world, unless the people perceive the system as just, justice does not exist.
Justice must be perceived by the community for justice to be
recognized and achieved. The Rodney King trial is an illustration.
Rioting occurred in Los Angeles because the citizenry believed that
a biased jury selected from an almost homogeneous locale acquitted a white Los Angeles police officer charged with beating King,
an African-American.4 ° The community perceived this jury verdict
36. JOANNE Ross WILDER, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 28-2
(1993).
37. ERIC SMITHBURN, JUDICIAL DISCRETION, National Judicial College 8, 1991.

38. Id. at 321.
39. Id.
40. Marcy Coyle, Jury Case May Spark More Suits, NAT'L. L. J., June 29, 1992.
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as an injustice and "shook up [other] jurors' perceptions of the system."4' After the King verdict, jury consultant Robert B. Hirschhorn
stated, "If [the acquittal] did anything in America, it woke jurors
out of42a coma ... in believing that law enforcement is always
right."

4. Monetary Savings
Saving money is important to taxpayers.43 Studies indicate the
UFC saves money because it requires fewer judges." Judges'
schedules are well coordinated to enable them to address legal
issues and social service experts work closely with the court to
evaluate and handle the families' concerns.45 These social service
programs include courses on crisis intervention and parent education.46 New Jersey's court administrators credit the UFC concept's
far less adversarial nature with making their system work with less
delay. 47 Greater emphasis is placed on mediation and alternate
dispute resolution for every matter except domestic violence
cases.48 Prior to implementing the UFC concept, New Jersey litigants could see as many as fourteen judges, who were addressing
various family issues in the context of a single case.49 In New Jersey, it is estimated that a single judge currently handles multiple
proceedings involving and affecting a single family in eighty percent of the time
the same proceedings would have taken under the
50
system.
old
Financial roadblocks should not interfere with the perception
and implementation of justice. A major obstacle to the UFC concept involves start-up expenses, which are encountered in implementing a UFC just as in implementing any other new business
enterprise. 5' Although, in the long rin, this concept is financially
more feasible than are the traditional models of non-integrated
family court, UFCs need technology and trained staff members to
41. Racial Divide Affects Black, White Panelists, NAT'L. L. I S8, February 22, 1993
[hereinafter Racial Divide].
42. Racial Divide, supranote 41, at S9.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Barnes, supra note 2, at 23.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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identify and track cases involving various family members.5 Such
an initial monetary investment produces effective results beyond
family court. One supporter analogizes, "It's like spending money
up front on Head Start. You'll spend less on the criminal justice
system and social services down the road.""
5. InternalEfficiency
Applying business principles and absorbing increased up-front
costs to produce efficiency in the handling of marital difficulties
involve a shift in paradigms for most judges. In the past, judges
advocated a slow method of family court scheduling, which did
not resolve the very personal and languishing dilemmas faced
within each marital relationship.54 This method was based on the
theory that families were best equipped to handle their own situations and, given enough time, would find their own solutions without the court's interference. Judges took a "hands-off' attitude toward the intra-workings of the family, presupposing that the family
"knows best."55 We now know the fallacy of that thinking.5 Cases
do
6
not fade away; rather, situations get worse if left to linger.
Moreover, the courts have generated their own barriers by creating specialty courts to tackle frustrating, complicated cases that
had been languishing within the system without any results. The
courts theorized a need for separate divisions to specialize in juvenile and family court 5 issues
because these areas were once
8
thought to be unrelated.
In Erie County, Pennsylvania, for decades, the court separated
dependency issues from termination of parental rights cases,
which, in turn, were separated from adoption matters. Different
judges heard each of these issues separately and often lacked the
familiarity with previous rulings and the contact with the parties
that were deemed necessary to decide such issues confidently.
Because of this lack of familiarity with the parties' situations and
a lack of awareness of the number of warnings issued to attempt
to reunify the family, judges permitted children to languish in foster care without the benefit of permanency planning. The process
52. Barnes, supra note 2, at 23.
53. Id.
54. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 43 (1973)

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 40-45.
SzYMANSKI, supra note 4, at 24-25.
Id.
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would slow down even more because of the need for a thorough
review of previous decisions concerning a particular family.
To terminate parental rights, the court must determine whether,
despite reasonable efforts to reunify the family, the parents either
refused or lacked the proper parental skills to satisfy the needs of
their children. 9 Only after the court finds that the state has satisfied this burden can the next step in permanency planning, such as
potential adoption, be convincingly addressed.
To achieve long-term stable planning in a UFC, the same judge
conducts all aspects of the proceedings to utilize court resources
effectively to shift parental responsibilities and costs from the
state to a smaller unit-the family.6 °
The traditional delayed and fragmented family court is not the
best way to run the "business" of the court system concerning
families. Consumers perceive justice when they receive consistent
treatment from the judiciary.61 By applying the UFC concept to the
"business" of the family, the court can provide consumer satisfaction, for sound business principles are not alien to the family. In
fact, the term "economics" has its origins in the family household.
Economy is derived from the Greek words oikos (house) and nemein (to manage),62 meaning "one who manages a household."63
Just as a family household faces many choices regarding scarce
resources, so does society.
C. PotentialDisadvantages
1. Judicial "Burn-out"
Judicial stress is one possible disadvantage to a UFC. Judges
whose caseloads are limited to family court cases on a daily basis
can suffer from judicial "bum-out."6'Family court judges must dispose of heavy caseloads
and are considered to have "the heaviest
6
workload."
judicial
59. RESOURCE

GUIDELINES,

IMPROVING

COURT

PRACTICE

IN

CHILD

ABUSE

AND

NEGLECT CASES 95 (1995). [hereinafter Resource Guidelines]
60. Id. at 97, 102.
61. Louise Everett Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court:
Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 KY. L. J. 1110
(1992-1993).
62. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 437 (2d. ed. 1991).
63. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 3 (1998).

64. Page, supra note 5, at 22.
65. Id.
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Implementing a UFC can avoid judicial burn-out because judges
traditionally become overexposed to a daily diet of the same particular cases. A UFC can included judicial rotation, which several
experts recommend as a method to avoid judicial overexposure
and the resultant interference with effective judicial performance.
To lessen judicial stress, judges are rotated "out" of family court to
maintain control of "the overly zealous judgmental judge whose
continued hearing of sensitive family matters is not beneficial to
the public."66 Although rotation breaks the continuity provided by
"one judge-one family," family court benefits by rotating "kingdom
builders" to other divisions "wherein they can do less damage.""
Other experts recommend each judge serve a minimum period
of a continuous term in family court. This term permits training to
occur. Because litigants may become dissatisfied with a particular
judge assigned to their cases when outcomes are not favorable,
judicial rotation provides an additional opportunity for consumers
to become more satisfied when new judges are assigned to their
cases.
2. Needed JudicialResources
Another potential disadvantage "involves the nature of the court
system and its lack of expertise, training or reliable information to
resolve intrafamilial disputes."68 Some experts maintain that the
courts are not in the business of deciding more than the immediate
issue to be addressed before them.6 0 Most judges are not equipped
with the specialized training needed to work in the areas of psychology or sociology and do not have the necessary staff to address these issues.7"
Instead, the court "should limit its dispositions to behaviorally
specific outcomes for its clients."71 One recommended remedy is
for a judge to employ a staff of experts for advice when specialized
knowledge is necessary." A judge can choose to rely upon these
experts or not, depending on the quantity and quality of knowledge
necessary for her or his decision-making process.73
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Page, supra note 5, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

12
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3. GeneralJurisdictionJudges
General jurisdiction judges have the authority to hear a multitude of cases in both civil and criminal trial work, as well as family
court matters.74 These judges may be reluctant to narrow their
broad jurisdiction to the limited area of family court.
The status and prestige of office for these judges may also be
affected when their jurisdiction is limited to the duties of family
court.76 Family court assignments have not been viewed as desirable court assignments.77 Experts have commented, "[t]oo often
family law issues are not considered worthy of the best judges,
attorneys, or facilities and
[are] placed at a level below adult
78
criminal or civil actions."
Implementing a UFC can upgrade respect for family court and
its judges. 79 Family court judges should have salaries, facilities, and
staff equal to those of the trial level judges.8 0 Some experts indicate
certain "perks" should be given in family court as incentives for the
large quantity of family court cases resolved."1 Once proper respect is received, proper funding will flow to recognize this respect.8 2
II. LIrERATURE REvIEw
This article begins with a discussion of business principles relating to effective management of court cases, accomplished by reviewing the law review articles and books by leading and prolific
writers such as Judge Robert W. Page, Hunter Hurst, Judge Leonard Edwards, and Linda Szymanski. The article also reports recommendations by committees and commissions that address the
future of family court, such as The Future and The Courts Conference and the Pennsylvania Futures Commission.
Various states have been and are experimenting with the UFC
concept. This article examines the statutes of jurisdictions such as
Vermont and New Jersey, which are already implementing this
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Page, supra note 5, at 41.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Page, supra note 5, at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
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concept.
Pennsylvania's case law and statutory law are examined in light
of the cases of PennsylvaniaState Association of County Commissions, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Allegheny
!') 3 and PennsylvaniaState Association of County Commissioners v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ( "Allegheny IT'). 4 The
article describes the developing case law related to the jurisdiction
of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas and its various divisions, such as juvenile court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
appointed a senior judge as a Master to make recommendations
for a unified judicial system. The Master's recommendations do
not address the potential role of a UFC. This article discusses the
details of relevant phases to implement the entire unified judicial
system with UFC as the focal point. The judicial and the legislative
branches can use a collaborative approach to fund and manage
important, yet volatile, family court issues for their constituents.
Recommendations from reports of the state of Kansas and King
County, Washington, are provided to highlight the advantages and
disadvantages involved in managing a UFC. The major points of a
report from the Monmouth County, New Jersey, pilot project are
examined because they explain the team approach method of resolving issues and the important role of advanced technology. The
Monmouth report noted a "one judge-one family" concept may not
be viable in practice; in contrast, a report from Deschutes County,
Oregon, indicated favorable findings to support its implementation
of this concept. Duplicate services were divided and effective
treatment plans were achieved.
In addition, this article provides vital information gleaned from
recent New York news articles about the enthusiasm of the three
branches of government, not only for a UFC, but also for a unified
judicial system. New York's chief justice, governor, and legislators
agree on the value of a UFC and a unified judicial system.
Finally, Vermont's statute, which clearly and concisely embodies
the unified family concept and which can easily be adopted to
meet the needs of Pennsylvania families, is discussed.
III. METHODOLOGY

This article reviews literature that develops the "one judge-one
83. 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987).
84. 81 A.2d 699 (Pa. 1996).
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family" concept. Law review articles provide the mechanism to
compare and weigh advantages and disadvantages of the traditional court approach as opposed to the "one judge-one family"
concept. Reports of the Pennsylvania Futures Commission recommend twenty-first century visions designed to meet the needs
of families.
This article explores whether the "one judge-one family" concept provides economic benefits, such as saving taxpayer dollars
and minimizing lost opportunities for consumers. In addition, this
article presents other economic principles-such as marginal
analysis, utility, maximizing self-interests, and beneficial consequences-and both applies these principles to family court management issues and relates these principles to the UFC.
Through an examination of stare decisis, this article develops
the current legal framework in Pennsylvania. The legislature's vesting of jurisdiction with the courts is explained through statutory
development. Recommendations from the Master's report to implement a unified judicial system are detailed, explored, and
evaluated as to whether a UFC would be consistent with that system.
This article also provides pertinent sections of statutes from
other state jurisdictions where UFCs are already in effect and
identifies necessary changes the Pennsylvania Legislature may
consider adopting to achieve beneficial economic consequences
for the numerous Pennsylvania families that need resolution of
difficult issues.
IV. THE FAMmY AND ECONOMIC THEORY

A. Introduction
At first glance, applying principles of economics to the family
seems counterproductive. However, judges and lawyers need to
recognize the relationship between economics and family court,
which extends beyond monetary resources. "Just as a physicist
must take into account the effects of gravity, so too must a lawyer
understand the effects of economic forces."85 By going beyond
monetary concerns, economics teaches lawyers and judges the
importance of incentives as they affect human behavior and the
manner inwhich scarcity of resources requires "choices or trade85. HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAwYERS 3 (1998).
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offs among competing uses of limited resources."s6 When consumers in the economy make these choices, economists believe these
stakeholders end up maximizing their well-being.87 Invisible economic forces create this balance as "gravity of the social world."88
Economic forces affect management of scarce resources in the
court system. By thinking in economic terms, lawyers and judges
utilize "a tool kit for solving problems and making decisions."89
Litigants, too, need to make effective choices to benefit themselves, which, in turn, will benefit the operation of the courts.9"
B.

Stakeholders in the Family Court System
1. Consumers

If consistent decision making and efficient case management are
achieved through the UFC, Pennsylvania can reach an optimal
level of maximizing its efforts to meet the needs of its citizenry.
Because UFC provides consumers motivational incentives, the
system also meets the efficiency expectation.
In a UFC, consumers are offered the opportunity to solve problems within their own family units effectively and efficiently. This
result is accomplished by establishing rules of law to provide "incentives for being part of the solution to the problem under litigation"9' and by promoting rewards for fairly bargained dispute resolution.92 Such rules provide the court with opportunities to resolve
cases in an ever-increasing caseload. 93
The "one judge-one family" concept promotes consistent, effec86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id.
89. ROBERT B. HARRIS, STUDY GUIDE FOR PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS iii (1998).
90. Id.
91. THE FUTURE AND THE COURTS CONFERENCE, ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE
STATE COURTS OF 2020 at 11, 144 (1991) [hereinafter the Future and the Courts].
92. Id; see also, Lois Gold, InterdisciplinaryTeam Mediation, MEDIAT. Q., December 1984, at 32. Clients are informed that mediation is preferred over the broad discretion that a judge can utilize in the courtroom to divide marital property, establish support awards, and impose custody/visitation schedules. Cases with identical facts could
likely result in different resolutions when heard by different judges, and appellate courts
are not likely to reserve the trial court findings unless the trial court has abused its discretion. The parties are motivated by these incentives to create their own settlements
tailored to the needs of their family to avoid the "element of arbitrariness [which] is
necessarily part of a third party's imposed disposition." Id.
93. Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, The Future of the Juvenile Court: PromisingNew
Directions, 6 Juv. CT., 131, 134 (1996).
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ive, and efficient family problem solving. A UFC system focuses
on family support and family preservation, thereby fulfilling the
needs of each family in a preventive fashion. 94 To do so, however,
the system must offer consumers incentives to change their behavior with the court's guidance.
Court consumers must have the opportunity to compare costs
and benefits if they are to change their behavior in the marketplace. Consumers acting as business owners in the justice system
will then maximize profits. State taxpayers ultimately benefit because the state and the court maximize costs and resources.
Providing incentives to consumers is one factor critical to designing court policy. Because court policies affect the public, the
repeat consumer, in turn, affects the costs of increasing caseloads
to the taxpayer.95 Judges as policy makers have a responsibility to
apply consistent management of each family unit proceeding
through the courts and affecting consumers' behavior.
Through their knowledge of the families in a UFC, judges make
decisions to prevent unexpected results. They could not do so if
they were unfamiliar with the family members and their needs.
Judges in a UFC are in a position to understand the true nature of
each unique family unit; however, these judges also recognize that
consumers themselves may be best qualified to decide if the judicial system can effectively meet their needs for dispute resolution.
Through dispute resolution methods, the court empowers consumers to solve their own problems.96 If the public perceives services provided in the family court as important and reliable, then
the public will view these services as deserving respect, support,
and popularity.
As court cases become more efficiently and effectively managed,
more litigants will be attracted to a UFC as a therapeutic alternative to resolve their issues. Some experts argue the better the family court system functions, the higher the costs to the system in
terms of time and money. They argue the increased volume in
families served will require an increase in personnel and related
resources to manage the growing caseload. Such an argument is
weak, because costs are saved through early settlement vis-4-vis
94. H. Ted Rubin, The Future of the Juvenile Court, JUV. JUST. UPDATE Aug./Sept.
1996, at 3.
95. Schepard, supra note 3, at 11.
96. Ann Milne, Mediation-A Promising Alternative for Family Courts, 42 JUV. &
FAM. CT. J. 63, 72 (1991).
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mediation despite an increase in volume of cases. In mediation,
individuals and taxpayers realize reduced costs.9 7
In juvenile delinquency and dependency matters, both monetary
placement costs and emotional costs to the child and the family
are reduced when permanency is achieved at an expedited rate in
a UFC. A delinquent child can be held more accountable and receive the necessary treatment in a short span of time in a community-based program monitored by a "one judge-one family" court.98
The juvenile justice system's organizational image is upgraded
from a tax liability to a community asset.99 A judge will rehabilitate
or treat a child in need and then return the child to her or his home
before the family becomes accustomed to the child's absence and
the parent-child bond is weakened or destroyed.l"°
A UFC aims to have fewer children in placement and more children living in their own homes, receiving "wrap-around" mental
health services within the home.'01 Taxpayers benefit when courts
expeditiously enforce orders requiring non-custodial parents to
reimburse the local government for services, including placement
costs. Through the domestic relations court, the same judge who
issued the juvenile court order establishes and enforces the support order.102
With the ever-expanding use of mediation, evaluations, parenting education, and support services for families, a UFC can better
serve the evolving needs of a family. Because "family life is neither
static nor predictable," dynamics within a family are best served by
the "one judge-one family" concept.103 The traditional legal process "was designed to manage discrete, one-time disputes, usually
arising from facts that were single events, not multi-decade rela97. Id., at 64-65. See also Graham, supra note 61, at 1123. However, assuming arguendo, that mediation is slightly more costly and even slower than litigation, it is believed
that adversarial proceedings take a toll on the family-especially the children. Id. at
1123-24. Consumers will benefit tremendously from the positive impact mediation has
in eliminating anxiety and anger, in particular, when disputes involve children. Considering the cycle of violence to which children are exposed, mediation is a way of life we
need to promote and accomplish for our children through a UFC. Id.
98. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAM SUMMARY, 5 [hereinafter
Balanced & Restorative Justice]; see also Philip G. George, Serving the Children,New
Jersey's Volunteer Child PlacementReview Boards, 81 JUDICATURE, No. 3 at 113 (1997).
99. Balanced & Restorative Justice,at 5.
100. George, supra note 98, at 113.
101. Id.
102. The author notes that this is the procedure followed in Erie, Pennsylvania
103. Leslie Ellen Shear, Life Stories, Doctrines, and Decision Making, 34 FAM. &
CONCIL. CTS. REV. 4, October 1996 at 456.
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tionships."' 4 Except in context of commercial law, which buyers
and sellers maintain ongoing business relationships out of necessity, "[1litigants who are not parents seldom have to maintain ongoing relationships with one another.""0 5
2. The Community
In 1959, Roscoe Pound emphasized the need for the law to protect the community. He advocated that community protection is
maintained through observance of the principles of respect and
dignity for the offender as well as the victim:
[T]he legal order should safeguard the human existence of the person
controlled. Thus the old-time sea law, with its absolute power of the
master over the sailor, the old-time ignominious punishments, that
treated the human offender like a brute, that did not save his human
dignity-all such things are disappearing as the circle of recognized interests widens and we come to.take account of the social interest in the
individual life and to weigh that interest with the social interest 10in6 the
general security, on which the last century insisted so exclusively.

In a UFC, respect and dignity are maintained by the court's encouraging consumers to solve their own family disputes, an approach focused on the best interests of all concerned. Community
resources, such as a CASA program, help the family and the court
by providing a fresh perspective to aid in developing permanency
planning in all states.
Pound also valued the importance of maximizing individual interests so long as these interests can be achieved without affecting
the community's interests. A UFC balances the individual's needs
with the community's needs when a treatment plan is needed, for
instance. Supported by a team of experts, the judge involved can
provide appropriately tailored treatment and incentives for the
natural parents to succeed in reuniting with their child. When the
natural parents fail to follow through with treatment, the judge in a
UFC can expedite termination of parental rights in the best interests of the child, which, in turn, is in the best interest of the taxpayer:
[T]hese are the social interests which are recognized or are coming to
be recognized in modem law. Looked at functionally, the law is an at104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 324 (1959).
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tempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust these overlapping
and often conflicting claims and demands, either through securing them
directly and immediately, or through securing certain individual interests, or through delimitations or compromises of individual interests, so
as to give effect to the greatest total of interests or to the interests that
weigh most in our civilization, with the least sacrifice of the scheme of
interests as a whole. °7

Pound foresaw the need to expand social paradigms to meet the
individual's needs through the law. He found frustrating the
"piecemeal" way the courts were dealing with the same family on
various issues in divorce, juvenile law, domestic relations, and
criminal court. He called for
an end to the waste of time, energy, money and interests of the litigants
in a system, or rather lack of system, in which as many as eight separate
and unrelated proceedings may be trying unsystematically and frequently at cross-purposes to adjust the relations
and order the conduct
08
of a family which has ceased to function"

Pound forecasted the need to unify the court. He would have approved of the UFC's unified community approach.
Pound emphasized the important roles that economics, politics,
and culture play in developing a civilized society while fulfilling the
need to satisfy the individual wants of each citizen. He recognized
the need to balance the following interests:
Three forms of this social interest have been recognized in common law
or in legislation: individual self-assertion, individual opportunity, and individual conditions of life. The first, the interest in free self-assertion, includes physical, mental, and economic activity. In Spencer's scheme of
natural rights, they appear as a "right of free motion and locomotion," a
"right of free exchange and free contract," deduced as a sort of free
economic motion and locomotion; a "right of free industry," deduced
expressly as a modem outgrowth of free motion and locomotion; as a
right of free economic activity;, a "right of free religious belief and opinion" and a right of free political belief and opinion; the two last being
deduced also as modem developments of the same natural right of free
motion and locomotion. Policies favoring free trade and free industry
are in part reference to a social interest in free economic self-

assertion. 19

In his discussions on jurisprudence, Pound discussed society's
107. Id.
108. Roscoe Pound, The Place of the Family Court in the JudicialSystem, 5 Crime &
Delinq. 161, 164 (1959).
109. POUND, supra note 106, at 316-31.
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interest in generating opportunities for individuals:
It is the claim or want or demand involved in social life in civilized society that all individuals shall have fair or reasonable (perhaps, as we are
coming to think, we must say equal)-political, physical, cultural, social,
and economic. In American thinking we have insisted chiefly on equal
political opportunities,... [b]ut a claim to fair physical opportunity is
recognized in public provision of parks and playgrounds and in public
provisions for recreation; the claim to fair cultural opportunities is recognized by laws as a to compulsory education of children (although the
social interests in general progress and in dependents are also recognized here) as well as by state provisions for universities and for adult
education; the claim to fair social opportunities is recognized by civil
rights law; and the claim to fair economic opportunities is recognized,
for example, in the legal right to "freedom of the market" and in the socalled "right to pursue and lawful calling [.]" 10

Family court litigants benefit from the internal efficiency of a
UFC, much like litigants do when nondomestic civil and criminal
matters are assigned to a single trial judge for the duration of a
case. The traditional adversarial system fails to address the needs
of families and their children, who languish anticipating the traditional system's scheduling of a court date assigned to an unfamiliar
judge.
Balancing an individual's interests with those of society as a
whole is indeed difficult. States such as Pennsylvania and Florida
have adopted an important philosophy, the balanced and restorative justice approach, to meet the needs of juveniles and
families."' This approach aims to balance the needs of the community, the juvenile offender, and the victim to promote community protection, competency development, and accountability." 2
The focus is on the community to create programs such as community service, mediation, and restitution as catalysts for a more
responsive juvenile justice system to meet the community's needs
in a proactive fashion.11 3 Such a community approach is in keeping
with the community focus of a UFC and is compatible with the
"one judge-one family" approach.
A balanced and restorative justice approach also abandons the
traditional court approach of demanding retribution from juveniles
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 319-20.
Balanced & Restorative Justice, at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.

1998

.Proposal for a Statutory Unified Family Court

21

to exact public vengeance. As Pound indicates, such vengeance
does not safeguard human dignity. Such government control in the
name of vengeance would obviously be perceived as ineffective
and undignified because it does not effectively deter juveniles from
subsequent criminal activity. The balanced restorative justice
model, although obviously not a new theory, is indeed new in application and lends itself to victim reparation, not juvenile punishment."4 Funded by the United States Department of Justice, such
an approach aims to assist jurisdictions in implementing a restorative, well-balanced model to weigh equally the needs of society and
the needs of individual juveniles in the system." 5 Applied to a UFC,
balanced restorative justice bolsters the community's perception
of the court as a leader in dispensing therapeutic justice.
Although Pennsylvania has limited the application of this concept within its specialized, fragmented juvenile court, it could easily extend balanced restorative justice to a UFC. This proposed
approach can be considered both procedural and substantive in
nature: the implementation of a UFC would be procedural,
whereas applying balanced restorative justice in sentencing juvenile offenders would have substantive impact.
Other jurisdictions already are implementing a UFC. New Jersey
is at the forefront of utilizing new programs to balance the needs
of the family and the problems associated with a finite budget.
Each locale or vicinage in New Jersey has, for the last twenty
years, had both a Child Placement Review ("CPR") Board and
Child Placement Advisory Council." 6 Composed of volunteer citizens, the CPR Board continually reviews the appropriateness of
juvenile placements. The CPR Board's review includes recommendations regarding juvenile placements.
Each judge decides
whether to institute changes in juvenile placements to conserve
financial resources and obtain higher-quality and more economical
treatment." 7 These changes are undertaken when they are in the
best interests of both the juvenile and the community.
In addition, the New Jersey Child Placement Advisory Council,
composed of volunteer citizens, provides recommendations for
statewide policy and procedures affecting children to New Jersey's

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at2.
George, supra note 98, at 111.
Id.
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highest court." 8 This advisory council reports to all three branches
of government (the supreme court, the governor, and the legislature) and is involved in monitoring and lobbying for necessary legislation impacting the welfare of juveniles in placement.. 9 The advisory council also provides the necessary training for volunteer
appointees. 2 ° CPR volunteers are credited with "maldng a difference" for children in placement in New Jersey; they assist in implementing the various federal and state mandates for children at a
minimal cost. Other benefits provided by CPR volunteers include
the following:
[They give] cases attention that might otherwise not be available, and
help relieve the burdens on the supreme court by making recommendations based on review and face-to-face interviews with the people involved. Finally, they provide a watchdog function over all the interacting
121
partners in placement to ensure no child is lost within the system.

As the above description indicates, New Jersey is coordinating innovative community-minded programs through its UFC to meet
the needs of children in more efficient and effective ways.
Other states also involve community energy and efforts at all
levels of governments, thereby attracting various professionals in
the fields of juvenile and family law. Relying on the efforts of professionals such as judges, prosecutors, legislators, court managers,
probation officials, victim advocates, and scholars, the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges is coordinating an
examination and evaluation of the juvenile court movement for
possible changes and new focal points.
One of the conclusions from a recent symposium of The State
Justice Institute emphasized the need for each governmental
branch to prepare a plan or blueprint for action. The highest level
of the trial court system should "provide individualized justice for
each child and family." 22 Certainly, a UFC in which the "one
judge-one family" model is utilized creates the framework for such
a blueprint for action.
The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, advocates that the court must address and
view issues affecting "individual members" in an "interrelated"
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.

121. George, supranote 98, at 113.
122. THE STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, 1998 GRANT GUIDELINE 1-2 (emphasis added).
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fashion "as part of a family unit."'23 Although Wisconsin has not
adopted a statewide uniform family court approach, Wisconsin is
experimenting with
this approach in pilot projects at various sites
124
within the state.

By adopting a UFC concept, Pennsylvania can provide its citizens with equal access to statewide community programs designed
to achieve long-term benefits. To accomplish this goal, Pennsylvania needs to abandon or revise the traditional, fragmented, specialty court approach by expanding the juvenile court's jurisdiction
to include family-related areas of the law. In so doing, Pennsylvania will enable its juvenile court to become more responsive to
meeting the needs and expectations of consumers in the community.
3. Incentives and Expectationsfor Stakeholders
The traditional juvenile court system in Pennsylvania, as in other
states, has intentionally isolated itself from the other areas of family law.125 For the sake of tradition, judges and lawyers continue to
separate
various areas of the law into specialties such as juvenile
12 6
court.

Judges in juvenile court tend to specialize in either or both juvenile delinquency and dependency cases. 127 The reasons often given
for continuing to separate juvenile court from the rest of the court
system are the large volume of cases and the specialized knowledge needed for allocation of resources (time, personnel, and
money)
to place juveniles when necessary to protect the commu128
nity.
Juvenile delinquency generates expenses for all parties involved,
129
including the perpetrator, the victim(s), and society at large.
123. Roundtable, Supreme Courts as Sources of Legal Change, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
113, 1199 (1997).
124. Id. at 1200.
125. Hon. John Foreman, It's Time for a Specialized Children's Court, 33 ARIZONA
ATTORNEY 15 (November 1996). See also THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, EMERGENT CONCEPTS
IN LAW AND SOCIETY xvii (Albert E. Wilkerson ed., 1973).
126. Paul A. Williams, A Unified Family Courtfor Missouri, 63 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L.
REv. 383, 385 (Spring 1995). See also Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and
the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. No. 2, at 5 (1992).
127. Edwards, supra note 126, at 10. see also Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating the
Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL.'Y 397, 412-13 (1991).
128. Edwards, supra note 126, at 29.
129. ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN & BARRY GLICK, AGGRESSION REPLACEMENT TRAINING, 3
(1987).
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These expenses of delinquency involve everyone's "pain, unhappiness, unrealized ambition and money."3 ° Awareness of the expenses should compel the courts to create more successful intervention steps to reduce and prevent juvenile crime, which harms
crime is a very high item on
the community. Preventing juvenile "13
"America's unfinished public agenda.

Carl G. Jung sets the tone for continuing to reevaluate the juvenile justice system to serve youth in a better, more effective, and
more efficient way: "The meaning and design of a problem seem
32
not to lie in the solution, but in our worldng at it incessantly."
When the juvenile court system developed in the early 1900s, its
aim was to "maintain 'benevolent oversight' of wayward youth" in
the spirit of rehabilitation, reeducation, and resocialization of juvenile delinquents. 133 When juvenile crime increased, the system
became more punishment oriented. Yet, the system's preferences
for punishment over rehabilitation has been considered ineffective
in reducing recidivism, 34as demonstrated by the ever-increasing
trends in juvenile crime. 1
Professionals responding to the needs of the community affected by juvenile crime must be mindful to place special concern
and emphasis on responding to the needs of juvenile delinquents
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. ADVOCACY CENTER FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED, FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
DISABLED YOUTH AND THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM [hereinafter Disabled Youth].
133. THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 'SYSTEM
viii (Joseph J. Cocozza, Ph.D., ed., Nov. 1992). [hereinafter Responding to Mental
Health]. See also FRANCIS BARRY McCARTHY, PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-1. Juvenile courts began in Pennsylvania in 1901 and
developed from a series of reform movements to change the harsh punishment of prison
time meted out to juvenile offenders. Id. This movement began to save these children
from wasting their lives. The most dramatic change occurred constitutionally, when
due process rights provided by the United States Constitution attached to permit juveniles "fair trials." See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also JOHN A. PALMERI,
PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE DELINQUENCY § 3.3.2 (1976). Each reform effort added a new
layer or stage in the development of juvenile rights. Id.
134. Responding to Mental Health, supra note 133, at viii. See also Hon. Charles M.
McGee, Measured Steps toward Clarity and Balance in the Juvenile Justice SYSTEM 53
(1989) (unpublished M.J.S. thesis, University of Nevada, Reno) (on file with University
of Nevada, Reno, library). Judge McGee asserts, "Sometimes punishment alone is
enough. An elaborate individualized case plan may not be necessary for a simple petty
theft for example. A young petit thief might learn lesson enough by a sentence which
includes a few days of being locked up and an additional restitution order." He adds, "In
many cases, of course, the Court will wish to retain its traditional jurisdiction over the
whole family and order further services, to give the child a chance to improve on several
fronts." Id.
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with disabilities.'3 5 In May, 1992, at a Special Work Session of The
National Coalition for the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Justice System, 136 professionals identified major areas to improve and guide
the future juvenile justice system to meet the changing needs of
youths involved in the juvenile justice system. These areas include
research, inter-agency collaboration, neighborhood-driven programs, education, assessment of amenability to treatment, treatment specificity, funding mechanisms, diversion programs, reducing the stigma of having a child "with mental illness or a child in
trouble," sharing information, and family participatory
treatment. 37 The twenty to sixty percent of juvenile offenders who
have emotional disabilities and are in need of
effective treatment
38
would surely benefit from such an emphasis.
Many of the nation's troubled youth have underlying emotional
disabilities, and many states are aware of the high incidence of
learning disabled children in the juvenile justice system. For example, the number of children with learning disabilities in Louisiana correctional facilities has recently climbed to forty-eight percent. 139 States estimate that juvenile offenders with disabilities
range from forty to seventy percent of the population. 40
One early warning predictor of juvenile crime tendencies is the
onset of academic difficulties in school.' Many believe a truant
child develops into a delinquent child. Children facing academic
struggles often become so frustrated that they stop going to
school, lose their self-esteem, and are at high risk for committing
crimes.'42
Frustrated children are angry with their teachers and other
authority figures, and this anger creates a hostile learning environment for everyone. Some experts suggest "if the mechanism of
this stormy path, this link between early school learning problems,
subsequent school failure and later adolescent juvenile delinquency could be more clearly delineated, then a more specific and
cost effective intervention strategy could be established."4 3 A pre135. Id.

136. Id. at viii-ix.
137. Id. atvii.

138. Responding to Mental Health, supra note 133, at vii.
139. Disabled Youth, supra note 132, at 1.
140. LEARNING DISABILITIES AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES 11 (1988) [hereinafter Learning].

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 12.
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ventive strategy is a UFC with a vigilant judge assigned to a family
to expedite scheduling cases of truant children before the court to
have them return to school before they commit crimes.
Under traditional juvenile court jurisdiction and legislation,
principles of punishment and "just desserts" replaced traditional
goals of rehabilitating juveniles in an effort to deter crime.'" Some
experts believe secure confinement accomplishes this goal, but
other policy makers, including judges, have considered the expense and effect of placement in secure long-term treatment centers and instead sought
the juvenile's family involvement as a more
145
alternative.
effective
In Erie, Pennsylvania, for example, President Judge John Bozza
has implemented a modified uniform family court, assigning one
judge to one particular family involved in dependency, delinquency, termination and adoption matters. A resource management team was created to keep placement costs at a minimum
while protecting the community. A child placement review board
or a resource management team of professionals in each of the
divisions of dependency and delinquency carefully reviews the file
with the caseworker and/or the juvenile probation officer. After
investigation, the team makes written recommendations to the
court for appropriate planning of the juvenile's treatment while
balancing and conserving taxpayer dollars. The team aims
46 for quality treatment at the lowest expense for the community.
This team approach combines the best interests of the juvenile
and the community. The community is a stakeholder in the sense
that taxpayers fund juvenile placements by paying taxes. The resource management team also reviews periodically the appropriateness of services provided to the child, including the juvenile's
clinical treatment and counseling. 47 By encouraging an expedited
treatment process, this approach shortens placement time and
thus lessens county expenditures. Juveniles currently in resident
treatment centers return home expeditiously so that a steady
stream of juvenile attendees who are newly in need of treatment
can take their places. The resource management team provides "a
watchdog function" so that no child is lost or ignored within the
144. GOLDSTEIN & GLICK, supra note 129, at 6.
145. James W. Davis et al., The Design and Implementation of Family Foster Care
Services for High Risk Delinquents, 48 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., No. 3, at 17, 21, and 30 (Fall
1997).
146. George, supra note 98, at 111.
147. Id.
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system. 4 8 A judge in a UFC monitors the team and can either accept or reject its recommendations.
With goals of conserving resources efficiently and effectively,
other concepts have developed to provide intensive treatment
within the juvenile's home. The juvenile participates in a detailed
prepared curriculum to rehabilitate and hold her or him accountable.'49 In Erie, for example, the Collaborative Intensive Community Treatment Program ("CICTP") was developed through the cooperative efforts of the Juvenile Probation Department, the Office
of Children and Youth, and the Perseus House. After they attend a
well-planned daily schedule of educational courses and treatment,
juveniles are monitored in the evening by a counselor who verifies
that curfews are followed. Programs such as CICTP decrease expenses in placements while increasing effects on juveniles. Intensive prepared curriculum programming is provided to each juvenile who qualifies for the program. Each program consists of specialized training for anger control, problem solving, leadership
sldlls, effective communication, empathy, cooperation, interpersonal skills, moral reasoning, understanding groups, and recruiting
supportive role models. ° These efforts teach juveniles to be
members of society instead of antisocial deviants. 5 '
Such positive community programs have developed well in conjunction with the "one judge-one family" concept. The judge assigned to a particular family assesses the juvenile's progress while
in treatment programs or placements. In fact, the "one judge-one
family" concept is the most reliable modality to evaluate efforts of
delinquency intervention because, theoretically, it offers closer
monitoring; however, research has not been obtained yet to prove
this point. Some experts assert that current delinquency intervention research lacks the necessary controls, sufficient samples, randomness of sample selection, adequate outcome measures, internal and external validity of statistics, and appropriate analyses required to be of great value.'
The hands-on approach of an individually assigned judge monitoring the progress of a juvenile appears to be a very effective
treatment method. If the child does not respond to a particular
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 113.
Davis et al., supra note 145, at 21.
ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN, THE PREPARE CURRICULUM 9-10 (1988).
Id. at 10.
GOLDSTEIN AND GLICK, supra note 129, at 7. See also EDWARDS, supra note 126, at
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treatment modality, the assigned judge can bring the case forward
to require the juvenile to attend a more restrictive treatment modality until she or he becomes actively involved with her or his
own treatment. Refocusing team efforts with such a new plan also
makes a juvenile competent for reintegration into the community
after treatment is completed.153
With Pennsylvania's new three-prong policy approach to juvenile
court cases, Pennsylvania judges in a UFC will evaluate and decide
juvenile dispositions in light of considerations encompassing
community protection, juvenile competency, and juvenile accountability. The UFC system consistently ensures each particular
family is seen by one assigned judge who utilizes her or his discretion to continue to dispose of juvenile cases effectively, efficiently,
and consistently for one family.
Judges have called and continue to call on the community to
help improve the courts. Given its inclusive approach, the UFC is
consistent with the need for judges to work toward the betterment
of each family unit entering the court system. Community interaction is critical to successful judicial decision making regarding
family issues:
Judges are asked to remedy the failure of community organizations in
solving their problems. Judges are then seen as failures when they are
unable to fashion a result to everyone's liking. The modem drama of
judges curing the ills of society while at the same time being isolated
from the support and resources of the community is tantamount to
judges being cast out of the community[.]The irony is that most judges
make little effort to convey to the community the difficulties of the
cases.154

The community of identifiable stakeholders in an effective justice
system involves every resident of of a state, including those who
never use the courts. 155 Indeed, "non-litigants pay for an ineffective
system through increased taxes, higher insurance rates and less
personal security."'56 Once in use, a "one judge-one family" court
system must be assessed to see if consumers perceive that they
are being properly served. A suggestion for a test is the following:
Do those being served grow as persons: do they, while being served, be153.
154.
42.
155.
156.

See Edwards, supra note 126, at 44-45.
Hon. Linda L. Chezem, Stakeholders in the Judiciary, REs GESTAE, Sept. 1995, at
Id. at 44-45.
Id.
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come healthier, wiser, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? And what is the effect on the least privileged in society:
will she or he benefit or at least not be further
157 deprived [and will] no one
be hurt by the action, directly or indirectly?

The courts have an obligation to the public to implement and then
explore the effectiveness of a UFC system. The court's responsibility to the community is to respond to the problem of juvenile crime
and violence, especially in view of the demands being placed on
the juvenile court system's limited resources. By implementing
community involvement through a team approach, the governmental branches will be providing a long-term strategy to make a difference that maximizes the welfare of each family unit.
In a "one judge-one family" court system, the court oversees and
monitors each juvenile's progress with a particular sense of reward
or satisfaction when success is achieved. Because incentives are
valuable and rewarding tools, the federal government has created
financial incentives to provide consistency in laws and community
policies regulating youthful offenders.
The United States Senate is considering legislation that lowers
the age at which youthful violent offenders may be certified as
adults. This legislation also includes measures to expand the
United States Attorney's jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. In
addition, the Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997, which has already been passed by the House, includes authorization for a $500
million block grant program to provide funds for prosecutors, local
courts, and juvenile detention facilities to act "as an incentive to
states to model their juvenile58justice programs after the revisions
to the federal criminal code."'
To qualify for funding, each state's governor must indicate
157. Id. at 43.
158. See Thomas A. Henderson, A Watch on Washington, 34 CT. REV., Fall/Winter 1997,
at 3. Apparently, authorization for the new program in H.R. 3 should not have been
created in the appropriation bill already signed into law as H.R. 2267. However, the
legislative branch, which "giveth and taketh away" appropriated without authorizing a
bill. Although confusing, we should remember, "since the members make the rules, they
can ignore them if the rules become inconvenient." Id.
Already signed by the President is a spending bill known as H.R. 2267, which
includes for the year 1998 an appropriation of $250 million dollars in a grant known as
"The Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant" for a program yet to be authorized.
Funds are pro-rated according to the juvenile population of each state.) Interestingly,
the Attorney General administers this grant, not the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("OJJDP"). Creators of H.R. 3, members of Congress, view OJJDP as
"being soft on crime, excusing violent acts because of the age of the perpetrators."
Barnes, supra note 2; SZYMANSKI, supra note 4.
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whether her or his state's existing or pending legislation imposes
"graduated sanctions for juveniles, lower the age of direct filing at
the discretion of prosecutors for violent acts of youths up to age
15, and maintain a system of records for repeat, adjudicated juveniles 'equivalent to that maintained for adults' if a subsequent offense is comparable to a felony."'59 For funding purposes, the juvenile court system must prepare and coordinate a communityoriented plan "representing the police, sheriff, prosecutor, state or
local probation services, juvenile court, schools, business and religious affiliated fraternal, non-profit,
or social service organiza1 60
tions involved in crime prevention."
The courts have begun to rely on the community approach to
solve increasing caseload problems in family-related issues such as
domestic violence. Judges in the State of Washington, for example,
brought together community leaders and other citizens at several
summits to provide "a springboard for the community to come together to address the issue of domestic violence." 61 A community
dialogue began as citizens realized "that the entire community, not
just the criminal justice system,1 6needed
to establish a coordinated
2
response to domestic violence."
Similar community dialogues engage policy makers and other
government leaders by emphasizing the true magnitude of the
problem with America's youth. One area of great concern involves
minority youth, especially African-Americans, who, although statistically underrepresented in many communities, are disproportionately represented at all levels of the justice system. Although
the traditional court system's failure to understand and adequately
address such issues as emotionally disturbed children may be a
more evident criticism, the fragmnented juvenile arm of the court
has been also cited for its deficient treatment of minorities: "the
juvenile justice system suffers from many of the same deficiencies
related to cultural sensitivity and the provision of culturally appropriate services that many sectors of the mental health, education,
63
and social services system have been charged with lacking."1
For instance, if African-American authors and advocates have no
confidence in the American legal system, how can we expect the
159. Id.
160. Henderson, supra note 158, at 45.
161. James M. Riehl, Washington State Summit on Domestic Violence, 44 CT. REV.,

Fall/Winter 1997, at 45.
162. Id.
163. Responding to Mental Health, supra note 133, at viii.

1998

Proposal for a Statutory Unified Family Court

youth, a less educated segment of the population, to have confidence in our legal system to resolve disputes? The perception of
the justice system on all levels is extremely important. For, indeed,
"[J]ust because we in the judiciary think that we provide rational
solutions to conflicts does not mean that our African-American
brothers and sisters will automatically 'buy in' to our methods.""6
To meet the challenges of the next century, we must create programs and policies to bolster the judicial system's trustworthiness
and to encourage all segments of the community "to place their
trust in the efforts of the judiciary."165 Implementing the "one
judge-one family" concept is not the solution; rather, it puts us on
the road to a solution regarding the problem of perceived injustice.
Moreover, "[jiudges are in a pivotal position to make a difference
in the way the public views the legal system."'66 Judges, as active
community leaders, are teachers of the law. Judges are also students of the law who must become more aware of the sources of
racial and cultural differences. Judges attending and participating
in new educational programs such as "Foundations in Pluralism"
gain "a clear understanding of the culturally posited differences" in
a group discussion format. In programs offering careful study of
history and literature, judges gain new insights and perspectives
from an examination of the writings of minority authors.6 '
In light of the economic incentives to produce a UFC, judges
now take an active role in opening doors for all citizens to begin to
respect and trust the justice system through the most basic societal unit-the family. Judges must go further, however, to bolster
this respect and trust by being culturally and socially sensitive to
the needs of diverse community groups. 6 ' Judges lead the community charge on behalf of all children when they advocate for
adequate economic resources necessary for court-coordinated
programs, such as a UFC. 69 Judges are active community leaders
when they participate in public education information forums and
serve on an active or advisory basis for youth service commissions
and organizations.' Judges maintain respect and trust when they
164.
REV.,
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Dale Segrest, Foundations in Pluralism: An Opportunityfor Dialogue, 34 CT.
Fall/Winter 1997, at 39.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 46.
SZYMANSKI, supra note 4, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
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become more active role players in local bar associations and
statewide judges' organizations to advocate court policy or statutory law changes regarding a UFC.17 '
Under effective judicial leadership, the UFC will promote consistency and inclusiveness while providing the necessary ingredients
for a solid judicial foundation for Pennsylvania.'72 To accomplish
this goal, we must examine the history of the Pennsylvania trial
courts, the Pennsylvania Constitution, statutory law, and case law.
Part V of this article undertakes such an examination. Pennsylvania stakeholders need to understand the importance of the governmental branches working together to implement a statewide
UFC.
C. FamilialRelationshipsas Economic Transactions
Judge Richard Posner has addressed issues of dependency, foster care, and adoptions in terms of free market concerns. He warns
that because there are parents who love their children little or not
at all, a state entity must impose legal
duties to provide care and
17 3
support for these children, education.
When a parent fails to follow through with necessary parental
care, the court must place the child in foster care.174 In a traditional
family court, the child could remain in foster care even after a series of hearings with various judges, each of whom consider the
subject of permanency planning and the best interests of the
child.'75 Under the "one judge-one family" approach, the same
judge focuses on the care and interests of a particular child placed
in foster care and expedites the child's case. To ensure the child's
well being, that judge closely monitors the case, including the care
and performance of foster parents.'76
Posner posits that foster parents normally present an unsatisfactory solution for children because the foster parents lack any incentive to reunify the family. After all, the foster parents lose remuneration when reunification between the child and the natural

171. Id.
172. Id. at 15.
173. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 149 (1992).
174. Id. at 150.
175. PUBLICATION DEVELOPMENT COMMITrEE VICTIMS OF CHILD ABUSE PROJECT, NAT'L
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING
COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 80-83 (1995).
176. Id. at 64.
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parents occurs.'7 7 The state, according to Posner, should lack trust
in foster parents because foster parents have no property rights in
a child's lifetime potential. 7 ' In Posner's view, foster parents as a
group lack incentives to invest in maximizing a child's potential for
earnings. He asserts that the problem of children being mistreated
in foster care79is far more serious in foster homes than in placement
institutions. 1
In reality, however, children can flourish socially with the personal care and attention of foster parents. A foster family approach
can always provide children with more care and attention-both
physically and psychologically and especially in the early formative years-than can the cold walls of a crowded custodial institution. Although it may provide adequate physical care,80an institution
lacks the ability to provide the necessary social care.
Posner has suggested an early intervention through adoption
even before parents neglect their children.18 ' The legal hurdle,
however, is that neglect must rise to the level of abandonment before the court system will terminate parental rights and place the
children for adoption.8 2 Under the "one judge-one family" model,
the courts can intervene at the custody stage to make an early decision regarding neglect, if warranted, and, after due process hearings, the court can place a child in foster care. By so doing, the
courts take strong and active steps183to ensure that families receive
the help to which they are entitled.
D. The MaritalInstitutionas an Economic Unit
The institution of marriage is, in essence, a business
partnership. 18 4 Marriage is a business contract 5 that traditionally
It differs only on certain points from comlacks specific terms.
86
mercial contracts.
Today, however, Posner and others with an understanding of the
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. POSNER, supra note 173, at 4.
180. FREDERICK ELKIN & GERALD HANDEL, THE CHILD AND SOCIETY: THE PROCESS OF

SOCIALIZATION 22-23 (2d ed. 1972).
181. POSNER, supra note 173, at 150.
182. Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 47-48.
183. Resource Guidelines, supra note 59, at 13.
184. POSNER, supra note 173, at 142-43.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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theories of law and economics might be impressed from a business standpoint by the evolving body of marital law in Pennsylvania emphasizing the importance of upholding premarital
contracts. 187 Marital property contracts are upheld in Pennsylvania
provided there has been full disclosure of assets. 8 Courts, therefore, apply sound business contract principles to these marital
contracts.'89 The meeting of the minds properly occurs when the
parties enter into the antenuptial agreement with knowledge of the
separate assets of each marriage partner.' 90
Posner details severe sanctions that occur more often in marital
discord than in everyday commercial contracts.19' Posner asserts
that if one spouse abandons the other, the abandoning spouse not
only pays damages in the form of support, but also defers remarriage until the original union's complete dissolution, including equitable distribution.' Pennsylvania has changed this concept by
permitting bifurcation of divorce from equitable distribution of
assets so that, in a fault divorce, the parties may remarry while the
economic claims remain pending before a court. 93
As evidenced by this progress on marital issues, jurisdictions
such as Pennsylvania are finding that bifurcation encourages settlements by freeing the parties from being "held hostage to economic demands."' 94 Some critics argue that, when bifurcation occurs, the case languishes and the parties are involved in protracted
litigation. Because the financially healthier spouse can afford to
delay the economics of the case and yet be free to remarry, the

187. See generally, Laub v. Laub, 505 A.2d 290 (Pa. Super. 1986).
188. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
189. Id. at 167.
190. Id. In corporate law, a similar principle of disclosure is utilized regarding acquisition transactions. The lawyer's duty is to perform "due diligence" in reviewing the legal

records and reports affecting an acquired company. The lawyer must perform this review "carefully." This involves considerable attention to disclosure and review of corporate matters by both sides' lawyers. Lawyers prepare comprehensive checklists to
investigate these corporate matters. Interviews and investigations are conducted by
lawyers with the officers, key employees, suppliers, customers, regulatory authorities,
principal(s), and shareholders. Investigations are done through courthouse lien search
records, Dunn & Bradstreet report searches, and news article searches. GEORGE T.
BISEL & MATrHEW BENDER & Co. 2 DUNLAP-HANNA PENNSYLVANIA FORMS (rev. ed. 1997).

191. POSNER, supra note 173, at 143.
192. Id.
193. WILDER, supra note 36, § 16-1.
194. Id. The parties bring closure to the emotional ties of the marital union and now
face the economic reality of leading separate lives through equitable distribution of
marital property. Id.
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less financially sound spouse is disadvantaged. 95 However, just as
any "business" facing liquidation, the parties in a divorce can stipulate to specific trial dates that cannot be changed without court
approval. Certain status quo conditions attach pending final disposition through equitable distribution, such as health insurance
premiums to benefit the less economically advantaged spouse.
Such conditions motivate
the other party to proceed to dissolve
196
the economic claims.
In a departure from Posner's initial determination, family court
enjoys and recognizes the benefits of using business contract principles to settle differences for the betterment of the "business" of
the household.1 97 This approach is consistent with Posner's view
of a household as a small business or factory. As a sound business
approach, the UFC system would further the combined missions
of both the family and the courts by encouraging more alternative
dispute resolution methods to settle marriage dissolution. This result, bolstered by the reduced emotional trauma for children when
parties facilitate their own settlement of marital property issues,
illustrates the greater effectiveness and efficiencies a UFC will
provide Pennsylvanians.
Posner's economic theory of marriage and children incorporates
the state's desire to maximize the aggregate welfare of its citizens,
especially children.198 Posner theorizes that an important aspect of
the business of a state court is to benefit the welfare of its citizenry
by maximizing our children's potential as adults. 9 9 To achieve an
optimal level of lifetime utility for children, he believes the state
demands a considerable investment from parents in terms of both
parental time and various market inputs, such as food, clothing,
and education."°° In addition, he advocates that communities possess a profound interest and expectation in maximizing the combined welfare of its children, their parents, and other family members.2 ' It is the intent of this article to prove that the "one judgeone family" model promotes and fulfills Posner's economic theory
to benefit Pennsylvanians by maximizing the interests of the entire
citizenry.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
WILDER, supra note 36, §16-1.
Id.
POSNER, supra note 173, at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E.

MarginalAnalysis
As Abraham Lincoln is quoted as stating, "A lawyer's time and
advice are his stock in trade."2" 2 One valuable resource for the entire legal system is time, a prioritized commodity. By choosing one
activity, one foregoes the opportunity to do something else,
thereby incurring opportunity costs. Reading this law review article is, indeed, an opportunity cost that is the "next best alternative
use of your time."2 03 The scarcity of time and the choices one must
make renders one's time a valuable resource. Whether one has a a
small or a large quantity of time available is not relevant to the
economics term of scarcity. "Scarcity means that there are alternative uses for limited resources."204
A litigant's decision to settle her or his case is that litigant's opportunity cost. This litigant may choose to spend her or his time
doing something other than attending a trial. Perhaps such a litigant, by choosing settlement, is also choosing to spend vacation
time in Hawaii.
These choices made by consumers or litigants need not be of
such a magnitude as a choice between a vacation in Hawaii or a
week-long hearing in Erie, Pennsylvania. In fact, economists indicate that most individuals confront choices on a smaller scale,
such as choosing to spend a one-hour lunch break at court or
choosing to settle a case to enjoy a relaxing lunch break.
Moreover, consumers are willing to accept substitutes. Economists describe choices as "at the margin" where the margin is the
impact arrived by "a small change in one variable on another variable."20 5 The following example best illustrates decision making at
the margin:
Suppose that you attempt to purchase a bag of pretzels by inserting fifty cents into a vending machine and pushing the appropriate
vending machine buttons. Your actions demonstrate that your ex202. This quote is attributed to Abraham Lincoln on a plaque produced by the Allen
Smith Co., Indianapolis, Indiana, from Bulletin of Lincoln National Life Foundation.
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 275 (1993).

203. POSNER, supra note 173, at 4. Opportunity costs, which are foregone opportunities sacrificed to perform a certain item, is also shown by the following: "For example, a
tailor may be able to sew either a pair of pants or two shirts in an hour. If the tailor opts
to make the pants, his opportunity cost will be the two shirts that could have been made
in the same time.
RESEARCH. AND EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ESSENTIAL OF
MICROECONOMICS 3 (1997).
204. MILTON

H.

SPENCER

MICROECONOMICS 3 (8th ed. 1993).
205. Id. at 4.
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pected marginal benefit from the bag of pretzels is greater than
fifty cents. Unfortunately, you failed to notice (prior to selecting
the pretzels) the next slot for a pretzel bag was empty and you did
not receive anything for your fifty cents. You are very confident a
bag of pretzels will be dispensed if you spend an additional fifty
cents. A friend says you are unwise to pay one dollar for a bag of
pretzels selling for fifty cents, but you reply that, on the margin, the
next bag costs fifty cents and that your marginal benefit from this
bag of pretzels is still more than fifty cents. You further explain
that the first fifty cents was in the past, and there was nothing that
could be done about it. The first fifty cents was a sunk cost, and
sunk costs do not affect your future decisions because you make
decisions on the margin. 6
Economists describe the basic rule of marginal analysis as the
marginal benefit of an activity being greater than the marginal cost
of an activity.2°7 Applying this economic theory to family court
would entail evaluating marginal benefits versus marginal costs.
An example of marginal benefit analysis is the consistency of decision making achieved through the use of the UFC approach versus
the marginal cost of having a single judge making decisions that
are not particularly liked or appreciated by the litigants.
If the marginal benefits of the UFC concept are greater than are
the marginal costs, economists say, "do it." Therefore, in the spirit
of economics this article proposes the courts implement the UFC
concept when consistency and time far outweigh costs. The courts
affect the parties by offering them incentives to resolve their own
differences, such as settling the case early to avoid a decision
made by a judge who may be disliked by one or both of the litigants.
F.

Utility

Another basic economics term involves the important psychological component of utility.2 "8 Consumers obtain utility by purchasing goods and litigants obtain utility by seeking favorable decisions or outcomes. Litigants also obtain utility by avoiding judicial outcomes that give them pain.2 9 Utility measures the level of
satisfaction that a person achieves from consuming goods or un206. Id. at 4-5.
207. Id. at 5.
208. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 88-89 (1998).

209. Id.
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dertaking activities.2"' When applied to the UFC system, utility
would track preferences obtained by consumers of this concept
through their contact with the court and court-related services.
As the court system becomes more predictable, consumers better understand their opportunity costs and achieve a higher level
of utility. Consumers achieve greater satisfaction from the court
system when one judge, who is experienced in the particular field
of law and acquainted with the needs of a particular family, makes
decisions on a multitude of related issues affecting the same family.21' Hence, consumers achieve more utility in the UFC system.
G. ConsumersMaximizing TheirSelf-Interest
Still another basic economic principle relative to our study of
consumer choices is the assumption that consumers behave rationally "to maximize their 'self interest."'2 '2 Economists, including
to Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, have termed this
behavior as Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model ("REMM")
and have identified four postulates to REMM.1 3
The first postulate is every individual cares about "almost everything from interpersonal relationships to the weather" and evaluates items by making preferences and substitutions or tradeoffs.
For instance, a litigant evaluates and substitutes by choosing to
settle for a large quantity of A over a small quantity of B.
The second postulate is each consumer's wants are unlimited
and her or his wants or values become "goods." She or he prefers
to have more goods rather than less.1 4 Goods are defined as "anything from art objects to ethical norms." 2 5 In family court, litigants
seek outcomes such as child support, custodial rights, or the permanency of adoption. As indicated by the number of repeat users
210. Id.
211. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (2d ed. 1997) (these
preferences by consumers are purely subjective, as illustrated). Each individual is
unique and therefore so are their preferences. As the saying goes, "Different strokes for
different folks." Because individuals have different preferences and different tastes, the
strength of the order of these preferences is not a concern for the economist. Instead,
economists point to other disciplines such as psychology and sociology to study sources
of preferences. Economists take consumer tastes and preferences as a given in that they
are determined outside the economic system. (The economics term for this concept is
"exogenous.") Id. at 17.
212. BUTLER, supra note 85, at 5.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Id. at 7.
215. Id.

1998

Proposal for a Statutory Unified Family Court

of the system, these wants illustrate the unlimited goods available
in family court.
The third postulate is each individual maximizes her or his share
of wants of goods because constraints such as time and money
affect the opportunities available to this individual. 216 In family
court, the cost of losing compensation time from work to prepare
and file a petition for child support as well as to attend a child
support hearing may not enable maximize an individual's want for
an increase in child support, which is a good. However, the litigant
assesses the marginal benefits versus the marginal costs. If the
marginal benefits are greater than are the marginal costs, the litigant, as a court consumer, will file a motion to modify child support so as to increase the current amount of child support.
The fourth postulate assumes that an individual is resourceful in
creating her or his new opportunities. 217 A consumer in family
court may choose to mediate to achieve their wants so as to bring
finality to her or his "cause" rather than to litigate through the
court process. Resourceful consumers may choose to have a mediator facilitate a child custody dispute instead of risking lengthy
litigation, emotional trauma to involved people, and ensuing court
appeals. Under the traditional family court model, individuals may
more easily vent anger with opposing parties by pursuing irrelevant issues or engaging in vexatious conduct. Under the UFC approach, in which one judge decides all issues involving the parties,
court actions and frivolous motions generated by one party to harass the other rather than to resolve a legally relevant issue can be
more easily identified and dismissed.
REMM also affects the litigants' behavior when those litigants
face new constraints, such as new operating procedures in family
court. Consumers are very creative and a "constraint or law will
almost always generate behavior which was never imagined by its
sponsors."218 For example, when the federal government imposed
the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit in the interest of conserving
gasoline and diesel oil, it did not anticipate the creativity generated
by human behavior in the form of REMM.219 Because they valued
their time more than cost, many consumers were willing to exceed

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
BUTLER, supra note 85, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
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the speed limit and incur the cost of fines. 220 Enforcement agencies, such as state police, had to invest in better radar equipment
to enforce the speed limit.22' In turn, consumers, invested in radar
detectors.22 2 Another example of REMM-inspired behavior change
is that many consumers chose alternative travel methods, such as
airplanes, to save time.223 In the court system, litigants who
choose mediation over lengthy, expensive litigation are engaging in
REMM-inspired behavior. Litigants will make more of these types
of choices in the UFC system.
UFCs implement new rules of law to provide "incentives for being part of the solution to the problem under litigation [and to] establish... a means by which fairly bargained and resolved disputes can be rewarded to institutionalize cooperative problem
solving into the court system." 224 An example of REMM at work in
a UFC is consumers' increased willingness to utilize private mediators or binding arbitration to resolve their difficulties outside of the
standard work hours. Access to mediation centers with evening
hours will mean fewer cases in family court. Is that so bad?
Adam Smith225 perhaps best explained human behavior and
choices:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual review of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was in no part of his intention. Nor is it always the
worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it .... every individual, it is evident,

can, in his local situation,
226 judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him.

220. Id.
221. Id.

222. BUTLER, supra note 85, at 8-9.
223. Id.
224. FRANKLIN M. ZWEIG, ET AL., Securing the Future for America's State Courts, in
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STATE COURTS OF 2020 at 144 (State Justice Institute and
American Judicature Society 1991).
225. BUTLER, supra note 85, at 23.
226. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF
NATIONS, 423 (1776) quoted in BUTLER, supra note 85, at 23.
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As applied to the court system, Smith's theory means that, by pursuing their own interests, such as the interest in receiving increased child support, litigants unknowingly create an "invisible
hand" that affects the court system's overall interest through the
vehicle of the UFC.
As a result of the more consistent decision making that results
from a UFC, families are guided to make better choices, which
benefit them, as well as the entire community. The individual attention to each family that is achieved through the UFC is deserved and valuable, because it both recognizes each family as a
unique unit and benefits the court system as a whole.
Judges who are familiar with each family can render decisions to
maximize the best interests of children. This article proposes that
the UFC will also create an invisible hand to guide and lead the
entire court system effectively and efficiently into the twenty-first
century.
H. Beneficial Economic Consequences
Enacting a UFC model will produce consequences "at the margin" and measurably enhance the family court system's efficiency
and effectiveness. Basic economics teaches that society has everything to gain by utilizing this concept, for it is far more important
to look at long-range effects than at short-term goals.227 Applying
this concept to the family court system, economics advocates a
system that traces long-term effects on all families as opposed to a
system that focuses on a specific issue at bar. Actual economic
consequences will be identifiable only through the implementation
of the UFC method.228 The Greek playwright Sophocles answers
those who would recommend deferral: "One must learn by doing
the thing; for though you think you know it you have no certainty,
until you try."229
V. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Pennsylvania
Courts of common pleas are courts of general trial jurisdiction
227. HENRY HAZL1Tr, ECONOMICS, IN ONE LESSON 17 (1979).
228. Id.
229. HARRIS, supra note 89, at ii.
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and have existed in Pennsylvania at least since the enactment of
the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1776.230 Before Pennsylvania
amended its constitution in 1968, there existed not only courts of
common pleas, but also courts of oyer and terminer and general
jail delivery, quarter sessions of the peace, and orphans' courts.
Pennsylvania's amended constitution abolished these separate
courts and incorporated them into the common pleas courts. Article 5, section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution establishes one
court for each of the sixty judicial districts, which generally follow
the geographic boundaries of the commonwealth's counties.231
Each judicial district consists of divisions and has "unlimited
original jurisdiction in all cases except as otherwise provided by
law.232

Title 42, section 931(a) of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
vests the courts of common pleas with "unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of
common pleas.233" Pursuant to section 931(b), their jurisdiction
"shall be exclusive except with respect to actions and proceedings
concurrent jurisdiction of which is by statute or by general rule
adopted pursuant to section 503 vested 234
in another court of this
Commonwealth or in the district justices."
In Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that one of the legislature's purposes in reconstituting
or consolidating powers of jurisdiction within a "unified" court of
common pleas was "to simplify
procedure and remove archaisms
235
from the judicial system."
Since January 1, 1969, the only court of original jurisdiction recognized and established as a court of record has been the reconstituted court of common pleas.236 An examination of the preamendment system reveals that cases had been dismissed because

230. DEP'T
OF
GENERAL
SERVICES
FOR
THE
COMMONWEALTH
PENNSYLVANIA, THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL § 5-5 (113th ed. 1997).

OF

231. There are, however, seven districts, however, that encompass two counties each.
232. PA. CONST. art. 5 §5.
233. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. §931(a)(1995).

234. Id. at § 931(b).
235. 401 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Pa. 1978).
236. Id. Common pleas courts, in addition to original jurisdiction over all cases not
exclusively assigned to another court, have appellate jurisdiction over judgments from
special courts. These courts also hear appeals from various state and most local government agencies. THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL, supra note 228, at § 5-6.
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they were brought in the wrong court.237 In Wadzinski, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejects the view that such a procedural
error should prove fatal, holding "if the matter is justiciable, there
is jurisdiction in the court of common pleas to hear it, and in a
multi-division court the remedy for bringing the case in the wrong
division is not a dismissal, but a transfer of the matter to the correct division."23
This "uniformity" in the jurisdiction of the court of common
pleas did not prohibit court divisions.239 Section 951(c) provides
for separate orphans' court divisions in eighteen other counties.24 °
Therefore, an orphans' court division was included within the
court of common pleas of any county that did not have a separate
orphans' court division.24 '
Another section of Title 42 confers a domestic relations section
for the purpose of assigning court staff only. Section 961 provides
that "[elach court of common pleas shall have a domestic relations
section, which shall consist of such probation officers and other
staff of the court as shall be assigned thereto."242
Both statutory law and case law vest each division of a court of
common pleas with the "whole" court's full jurisdiction. According
to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, jurisdiction of a contract or
assumpsit action by a former wife against her former husband can
be enforced in any division of the court of common pleas because
each division has the authority of the "whole" court.243 In determin237. Wadzinski, 401 A.2d at 1132.

238. Id.
239. Title 42 specifically divides the courts as follows:
(a) Philadelphia County.-The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County shall have
the following divisions:
(1) Trial division.
(2) Orphans' court division.
(3) Family court division.
(b) Allegheny County.-The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County shall have the
following divisions:
(1) Civil division.
(2) Criminal division.
(3) Orphans' court division.
(4) Family division.
42 Pa.Const. Stat. § 951 (1995).
240. These courts of common pleas include those of Beaver, Berks, Bucks, Cambria,
Chester, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie, Fayette, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lehigh, Luzerne,
Montgomery, Schuylkill, Washington, Westmoreland, and York counties. 42 PA. CONST.
STAT. § 951(c).
241. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 951(d).
242. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 961.
243. Guerin v. Guerin, 442 A.2d 1112 (Pa. Super. 1982). See also In re Estate of Can-
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ing proper jurisdiction, the court division to which a type of case
had been administratively assigned is not relevant.2 "
Regarding "juvenile court," the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held, in Commonwealth v. Johnson, that neither the Pennsylvania
Constitution nor statutory law confers separate subject matter jurisdiction for "juvenile court"; rather, there exists one court of
common pleas composed of separate court divisions and vested
with "whole" court jurisdiction. 24 5 Each division with the court of
common pleas is considered to be vested with jurisdiction of the
whole court.246 Therefore, once a case has been allocated to a division, a court's decision thereafter binds the whole court with respect to procedural rights such as double jeopardy. Thus, in Johnson, a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
ruled that once the juvenile court had adjudicated the defendant as
delinquent, the defendant's subsequent criminal prosecution as an
adult violated the defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy.247 The superior court found that holding otherwise would
permit the Commonwealth to reprosecute a minor as an adult,
thereby subjecting an individual to multiple prosecutions for the
same offense.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Johnson48 and recognized the intent of Pennsylvania's legislature to vest limited and
exclusive jurisdiction in a "special needs" court for juveniles. 49
The court viewed juvenile court as a legislatively crafted exception
250
to the section 952 grant of full jurisdiction to the "whole court."
The supreme court noted that, although the legislature granted
juvenile court separate operating powers regarding the "special
needs of our youth," juvenile court must have proper jurisdiction
for its rulings to bind the whole court. 1 The court seemed intent
on avoiding "absurd" results that could arise if juvenile court did
not have "proper"jurisdiction.252
For example, an adult erroneously believed to be a juvenile
could have her or his case heard by the juvenile division. Obvitor, 621 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. 1993).
244. Id.
245. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 645 A.2d 234, 242 (Pa. Super. 1994).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 246.
248. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 669 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1995).
249. Johnson, 669 A.2d at 320.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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ously, the court would follow its own procedures and rules. It
would make its final determination and dispose of the case using
the limited methods of rehabilitation available. This adjudication
would, nonetheless, be binding and, as such, would preclude
proper prosecution in the criminal division because of the privilege
against double jeopardy." 3
The supreme court opted for "a more reasonable reading of section 952" as follows:
[E]very division of the court of common pleas [has] the jurisdiction to
transfer any case property heard in the court of common pleas to the
proper division having subject matter jurisdiction over that particular
matter. This would also take into account the fact that the power and
authority
of the court of common pleas is defined and limited by legislation. 254

The Johnson Court carefully defined "jurisdiction" using the plain
meaning provided in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary; that is, as
"the power, right or authority to interpret and apply the law" or
"the limits or territory within which authority may be exercised." 5 5
Applying the definition, the court held the transfer order to be jurisdictional "in every sense of the term" and further ruled that "if
the challenged order is improper, jurisdiction does not vest with
the receiving court. If jurisdiction does256not vest with the court,
then jeopardy likewise does not attach."
The court reviewed the "propriety" of Johnson's transfer order
and found the trial court had properly transferred the case to juvenile court. 25 7 The transfer order was also appealable of right;
therefore, the court admonished the commonwealth's counsel for
failing to immediately appeal the transfer order. According to the
court, such an appeal would have avoided "unnecessarily placing
an individual through the stress
and burden of two separate pro2 58
conduct.
same
the
for
ceedings
In Johnson, the court makes an important point about the equal
stature of the juvenile court with the other divisions in the court
system. Precious constitutional rights, such as the privilege against
double jeopardy, do attach for a juvenile in juvenile court.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Johnson, 669 A.2d at 321 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 321-22.

257. Id. at 322-23.
258. Id.
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In Pennsylvania, the juvenile court can bind the other divisions
with its rulings on behalf of the "whole" court, provided it was initially vested with proper jurisdiction.
An economic discussion regarding the proposal for a UFC in
Pennsylvania should address judicial system. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court appointed a Master to address and plan for the implementation of a unified court's structure. Beginning with Allegheny I, in 1987, the supreme court ruled that the statutory
scheme obligating counties to fund common pleas courts violated
the 1967 constitutional
mandate that had created the unified judi259
cial system.
In Allegheny I, the court explored the plain meaning of the word
"unity."260 The court pointed to difficulties arising from labor management issues "embroiling" judicial districts against county commissioners, for instance, and "their history of strife."261 The court
remarked, "[i]t goes without saying that when relations between
the judicial branch and the county governments deteriorate to the
point where litigation is required to settle disagreements as to
funding, the relationship
is neither harmonious nor unified, but
262
rather, fragmented."
Justice John Flaherty, now Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, wrote that the court should not only review the
literal meaning of the words "unified judicial system," but should
also be aware of the legal and constitutional implications of these
words.263 In addition to its duty to provide appropriate staff who
are not influenced by local political figures, the court must also
strive to ensure neutrality and fairness in governing the disposition
of every case and to improve the public's perception of justice.2
Justice Flaherty wrote:
But if court funding is permitted to continue in the hands of local political authorities it is likely to produce nothing but suspicion or perception
of bias and favoritism. As the framers of our constitution recognized, a
unified system of jurisprudence cannot tolerate such uncertainties. All
courts must be free and independent from the occasion of political in259. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 534 A.2d 760, 765 (Pa.
1987).
260. Id. at 763 (citing the definition supplied in Webster's Dictionary: "to cause to be
one: make into a coherent group or whole: give unity to: harmonize.").
261. Id. at 764.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Allegheny I, 534 A.2d at 764-65.
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to be biased in favor of
fluence and no court should even be perceived
2 65
local political authorities who pay the bills.

For these reasons, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in Allegheny I, "the statutory scheme for county funding of the judicial
system is in conflict with the intent clearly expressed in the constitution that the judicial system be unified." 266 Interestingly, the
court, in a patient and insightful effort to provide the state legislature with the necessary time to enact "appropriate funding legislation," entered its judgment for the county as follows, "until this2 is67
done, the prior system of county funding shall remain in place."
Justice Flaherty noted "the authority of this court to direct payment of funds necessary for the funding of the judicial system does
not intrude upon the legislative power of appropriation, but is
merely an exercise of this Court's inherent power to preserve itself
as a coordinate branch of government." 268 The Allegheny I Court
also credited Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
wherein the United States Supreme Court maintained a constituflawed system until Congress could review and replace
tionally
9
it.

26

In response, Pennsylvania's legislature appropriated one million
dollars to examine and evaluate the options in enacting legislation
to effectuate a change. However, this appropriation was "apparently never used for the intended purpose. 2170 In 1996, in Allegheny
II, the supreme court held that a writ of mandamus is an appropri271
ate manner in which to enforce funding a unified court system.
The court recognized that the general assembly has the mandatory
obligation to fund the state courts and that the petitioners have no
other remedy at law.272
The court then pointed to stare decisis in Pennsylvania cases
265. Id. at 765.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at n.2.
269. Allegheny I, 534 A.2d at n. 3 (citing, Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
270. Pennsylvania State Association of County Commissioners v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, No. 112 Misc. 1492 (Pa. 1996) (Interim Report of Frank J. Montemuro, Jr.,
Esq., Master) [hereinafter Montemuro Report]. According to said Master, "The order
underlying this report results from a mandamus action filed in 1992 by the Pennsylvania
Association of County Commissioners and ten counties seeking to enforce the order in
Allegheny I." Id. at 7.
271. Pennsylvania State Association of County Commissioners vs. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 681 A.2d 699 (Pa. 1996).
272. Id. at 702.
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regarding the co-equality of the three branches of government. The
court recognized the legislature's necessary taxing and spending
powers to sustain the judicial branch and stressed the need for
cooperation among the three branches of government.273 The A//egheny II Court cited the case of Beckert v. Warren,274 as standing
for the court's power to compel the legislature, which "has the
power of life and death over all the courts,"275to fund the judiciary
for "proper functioning and administration."
In Allegheny II, the supreme court emphasized the importance
of "the continued existence of an independent judiciary" and then
concluded:
Because this court has attempted to act cooperatively with the General
Assembly and has denied prior petitions for enforcement, allowing the
General Assembly a period of nine years to enact a funding scheme
which would provide the necessary finacial support for state courts,
and because the General Assembly has failed to act within this extended
reasonable period of time, we now grant petitioner's request for a writ
of mandamus. Pursuant to this writ, jurisdiction is retained and by further order a master will be appointed to recommend to this court a
schema 27
which
will form the basis for the specific implementation to be
6
ordered.

Finally, the court ordered the appointment of a Master, Senior
Judge (former Justice) Frank J. Montemuro, Jr., to recommend a
plan to implement a unified judicial system.277
In his Master's Report, Senior Judge Montemuro, before reporting on the economic advantages and disadvantages of a unified
court, discussed current consumer perceptions of the court's impartiality and independence:
It is, in fact, public perception, or rather misperception of the judicial
system, its components and its functions which, in part, fuels the contention over state funding. First, the anachronistic view that 'courts [are]
a place where people in black robes ma[k]e bad decisions.' Is not entirely facetious, in some measure because the expanding role of the
courts in providing, e.g., social services, is not well entrenched in public
awareness. 'Justice' is an abstraction, and the danger, as Justice
Pomeroy points out in a slightly different context, is lest the court system be seen as merely another competing need, like a hospital or a park,
not 'a separate branch of government, co-equal with the executive and
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 702, 703.
439 A.2d 638 (1981).
Allegheny II, 681 A.2d at 703.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 700.
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legislative branches ... the distinction is not one of degree, but of kind.'
The difference is, in fact, between what can be called 'therapeutic jurisprudence' versus the 'dispassionate magistrate' model; the latter image
prevails, with variations, in the public imagination despite the emerging
dominance of the former. Moreover, the expense of funding an abstraction provides another sticking point, as the counties must rely almost
exclusively on the proceeds of local real estate taxes, and27in
8 some areas
a shrinking base for such taxes, to fund the judicial effort.

The Master urged that "it must be made crystal clear in formulating a transition plan that state funding of the unified judicial system is not merely an economy measure."279 He warned that, although this plan is not a solution to local taxation difficulties or
balance of power issues, both will be affected..2 He also emphasized the need for adequate funding, citing a statement by the chair
of the American Bar Association's Ad Hoc Committee on Funding
the Justice System: "The independence and autonomy of an organic Court system is attacked from within by
under allocations as
28
well as "conspicuous attacks from without." '
The Master determined that implementing the plan would produce economic advantages that are absent under the current court
plan. These advantages were: "more stringent state reporting requirements, more rigorous standards of efficiency and accountability."28 2 The disadvantages included increased expenses inherent in
state financing; "compensation for prior deferred county spending;
upgrades of personnel, services and technology to meet statewide
standards; any necessary improvement of salaries and fringe benefits; [and]
equalization of regional disparities in programs and serv283
ices.
The Master attributed the current system's deficiencies to the
diverse systems in accounting being employed in different localities and to the lack of sufficient administrative infrastructure to
enforce "more rigorous standards."2 Once the plan is implemented, however, Senior Judge Montemuro predicted that management will become more effective, competent, and efficient,
prognosticating that "[o]nce in place, this central managerial core
will be able to define its local executive organization, capable of
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Montemuro Report, supra note 270, at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Montemuro Report, supra,note 270, at 10.
Id at n. 13.
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providing the necessary services, and trained in the accounting
and auditing procedures, human resource and computer systems
necessary for compliance with state standards." He also commented that diverse local court rules were "traps for the unwary"
and frustrated the multi-jurisdictional practice of law. This frustration has "inevitably eroded public trust and confidence in the judicial branch"
by "driving up litigation costs and increasing
28 5
delays."
The Master's four-phase plan targets July 1, 2000, as the specific
date to implement Phase II.286 He raised other considerations that
must be taken into account to make necessary changes for achieving Pennsylvania's unified judicial system:
However, change does not occur in a vacuum. Even these impulses
alone might not have occasioned the massive reformation implicated by
a transition to state funding were it not for changes in our culture which
dictate increased contact between the average citizen and the courts:
increases in litigiousness and a resulting recourse to the courts for solutions to new problems occasioned by advances in technology and science, by the changing nature of the family, increases in the crime rate,
and by changes in the function of a court itself, as its involvement in the
community becomes more complex and multi-faceted. The changes
wrought by a transition as far reaching as this must of necessity be profound; they will also be positive, affecting the Judiciary's relationship
with the citizens of the Commonwealth whom it serves, as 287
well as with
the two sister branches of government with which it serves.

The Master concluded that his recommendations "will serve to
bolster public trust in the judiciary, whose members are officials
chosen by the electorate to be invested with the responsibility of
evaluating the means and fulfilling the need for equal justice,
equally accessible to all citizens." 8
Although the Master's recommended plan for a unified court
envisions "bolstering" public trust, it does not include a vision of a
UFC. Family court is a necessary component to maintaining the
public's trust and a UFC has goals that are consistent with the
goals for implementing a unified judicial system. This article recommends the "one judge-one family" concept be considered as a
relevant phase of this unified judicial plan.

285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Montemuro Report, supra note 263, at 34.
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OtherJurisdictions

In 1914, Hamilton County, Ohio, created the first family court on
a local level." 9 It was not until 1961 that the State of Rhode Island
implemented a statewide comprehensive family court.290 In 1965,
Hawaii followed this lead with a very comprehensive statute.291
These pioneering states were followed by other jurisdictions:
South Carolina (1968); the District of Columbia (1970); Delaware
(1971); Louisiana (1979); New Jersey (1984); and Vermont (1990).
In addition, various family court pilot projects were created in the
states of Florida, Kentucky, Maine, and Virginia 292

Kansas state district courts are currently experimenting with
authorizing a UFC by "permissive" statewide court rule "to improve the treatment of children and families."293 The Kansas courts'
implementation study recommended that the Kansas legislature
make a "long-term fiscal commitment" to adopt a statewide family
department for the district courts and advised the judiciary to lead
this charge with a long-term
commitment to establish and maintain
294
department.
this family
Another recommendation is for the Kansas Legislature to consider developing "an effective case management information system by relaxing confidentiality restrictions on information that will
assist families in the court system."295 This system would relax restrictions on information and encourage sharing of information
between the various subparts of family court. The current lack of
information sharing is an area of concern for the courts because an
understanding of the particular families in the system is critical to
the success of a UFC. Each area within the family department
needs to release information to enhance the performance of other
departments.
Kansas' proposed family department would include jurisdiction
over divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, custody, support,
paternity, visitation, termination, dependency, adoption, juvenile
289. Robert W. Page, "FamilyCourts". An Effective JudicialApproach to the Resolution of Family Disputes, JUv. & FAM. CT. J., 1993, at 4.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 5. In addition, unified family courts have been recognized internationally
since they have been adopted in Canada and New Zealand, for instance. Id.
293. E. HUNTER HURST & JEFFREY A. KUHN, THE CORPORATION
FAMILY DEP'T FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF KANSAS, 1 (1993).

294. Id.
295. Id. at 3.

FOR

CHANGE,
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offenders, traffic offenses committed by juveniles, protection from
abuse in domestic violence, alcohol- and drug-related matters,
conservatorship, guardianship, and mental health matters for juveniles and adults.296 Under this proposal, the family department
would also have jurisdiction over criminal domestic violence, probate matters involving estates and trusts, and elder abuse by adult
children.297
The Kansas study illustrates, by use of the following example,
the "worst case scenario" that could occur in the fragmented traditional family court:
Parents file for divorce. The judge assigned to the matter grants temporary custody of the couple's 15-year-old daughter Sue to the father with
reasonable visitation by the mother. While living with her dad, Sue borrows his car and has an accident and is cited for failure to yield the right
of way. Father is furious about the ticket, and the next day Sue tells her
school counselor that he beat her. The counselor reports the incident to
Social Services Agency, which investigates and files a child in need of
care petition. The petition will be heard by another judge. Meanwhile,
Sue has forgotten to pay her traffic ticket, and a third judge of the municipal court has issued a bench warrant for her.298

The number of judges involved in the above-described scenario
would be reduced to one under a UFC. The study emphasized the
lack of funding within the fragmented traditional family court for
adequate salaries and services, as well as the fact that there were
no increases in personnel during the preceding 14 years.299 In identifying the need for long-term additional funding resources, the
report highlighted the economic benefit derived for the children
involved in a UFC, explaining that "while there is no directly
proven cause and effect correlation between family court performance and children in poverty, it is worth noting that[,] of states
with family courts in place for eight or more years, the majority
have twenty percent fewer children in poverty than in states without family courts."300
To date, Kansas has not enacted a state statute or court rule
clearly articulating particular reasons for establishing a family department. Authority exists, however, to establish such a depart-

296. Id.

297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 4.
HURST & KUHN, supra note 293, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6.
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ment on a district-by-district basis.3"'
The Kansas Legislature attempted to establish a family court in
the past. Legislation had been introduced but never enacted. The
report encourages the Kansas courts to move forward with statewide court rules "on a permissive basis" and, "with the input of
Kansas judges and lawyers," to draft supreme court-approved
rules.3" 2 Each district would have family departments under wellestablished and specific principles.3 3 In addition, the rules of court
would contain a preamble reiterating the family court's purpose to
maximize non-adversarial resolution of family conflicts and to establish an adequate standard to deliver services to children and
families in need.304
The Kansas report also addresses an oppositional statement raising concerns that a UFC would be in direct conflict with the progress of a Kansas unified judicial system. The report's response to
this argument supports a Kansas UFC:
Implementation of a family department of the district court rather than a
completely separate family court will not violate the spirit of court unification that occurred in Kansas in 1977. In fact, the authority to create
specialized divisions of the district court is specifically authorized
within KSA 20-438 and is inferred via State Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 executed by Chief Justice Harold Fatzer in November,
1976, seemingly in anticipation of impending court unification in January, 1977.305

In summary, UFC jurisdiction would be "tightly focused by the
Supreme Court" of Kansas to provide "the power basis or foundation for all types of family dispute cases excluding adult criminal,
probate functions and elder abuse."30 6 The Kansas report concludes that a UFC is consistent with the aims and goals of a unified
judicial system.
In addition to the Kansas experiment, various pilot projects have
been launched across the United States in communities, including
King County, Washington, to provide "consistent and uniform access to information as the foundation for coordination of
services. ""' The King County Council appropriated funds to link its
301. Id. at 10.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
HURST & KUHN, supra note 293, at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.

306. Id. at 21.
307. KING
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youth services department, deputy prosecuting attorney's office,
department of judicial administration, and Superior Court. 0 8 The
department of judicial administration collected initial information
about case overlap. These data indicate that forty-eight percent of
family court cases filed in King County between 1990 and 1995 had
directly overlapped with at least one other case within that fiveyear period.3 °9 Dependency cases in King County occurred at a
very high rate, followed by domestic violence and dissolution
10
cases.

3

In addition to advocating judicial training, the report advised the
King County court system to manage its cases aggressively with
tracking systems.3" The courts and their administrators are urged
to develop a method to identify and assign "high conflict" cases to
a special track.312 This special tracking system would enable case
managers to monitor such "high conflict" cases
for the purpose of
3 3
evaluations or alternative dispute resolution.
The Georgia court system is also exploring family and juvenile
issues.3 14 In 1985, a task force created by Governor Joe Frank Harris issue a final report recommending that juvenile court function
as a superior court division and that other domestic-related matters be addressed by said division.315 Other groups and task forces
advocated for family court jurisdiction.316
Judge Steven J. Messinger recognized creating an independent
family court for Georgia would entail major constitutional and
statutory revision.317 He asserted that creating an independent family court would serve to eliminate an otherwise-effective superior
court system.318 Instead, Judge Messinger proposed a creative third
option to expand juvenile courts' subject matter jurisdiction
REPORT TO KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION,

6

(1996) [hereinafter King County].
308. Id. at 6.
309. Id. at 9.
310. Id.

311. Id. at 10.
312. King County, supra note 307, at 10.
313. Id.

314. Steven J. Messinger, On Moving Toward a Family Court in Georgia Without the
Need for ConstitutionalRevision, 12 GA. S. U. L. REV. 667 (1996). Judge Messinger is a
graduate of the Master's Program for Family and Juvenile Court Judges at University of
Nevada at Reno.
315. Id. at 667-68.
316. Id. at 668.
317. Id. at 685.
318. Id.
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through general legislation-and, therefore, without revision to the
Georgia Constitution.31 9 Judge Messinger proposes reassigning
cases to experienced juvenile court judges.32 The reassignment
would correlate well with the focus of the current docket of juvenile court, as well as with issues involving the care, protection, and
development of children.32 ' This docket, as proposed, would include cases involving legitimation, paternity, child support recovery and
modification, change of custody or visitation, and adop3 22
tion.
As is discussed above, New Jersey continues making significant
strides in a unified judicial system area by legislative
enactments.3 23 The New Jersey Constitution vested the supreme
court with rules to manage the courts and support personnel, such
as clerks and sheriffs.3 24 The assignment judges for each county,
who are appointed by the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, are delegated authority to administer in their counties.325
Moreover, the state's administrative office centrally manages all
case flow information and distributes this information to the assignment judge for her or his administrative use.326
By statute effective December 30, 1983, New Jersey abolished its
juvenile, domestic relations, family, and county district courts but
allowed for specific exceptions.327 In 1983, New Jersey established
a statewide UFC by constitutional revision and merged formerly
separate juvenile and domestic relations courts into its highest trial
level, the superior court.3 28 Each jurisdictional circuit includes a
family division with a presiding judge and division administrator.329
The family division's jurisdiction encompasses child abuse and
neglect, delinquency, domestic violence, "juvenile-family crisis"
offense), support, custody, dissolution, paternity, and adop(status
330
tion.
319. Messinger, supra note 305, at 685.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ERNEST C. FRIESEN, ET AL., MANAGING THE COURTS 11 (1971).
Id.
Id.
Id.

327. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-3a (West 1983).
328. H. Ted Rubin & Victor E. Flango, Court Coordination of Family Case, 1992
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE 59 [hereinafter Court

Coordnation].
329. Id.
330. Id.
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A new pilot project, which is funded by the State Justice Institute, is underway in Monmouth County, New Jersey; this program
is designed to expand the UFC approach into a "holistic" view for
handling family issues."' Under this holistic approach, practitioners shift their practices from specialties to generality to avoid the
barriers that specialization creates in family court.332 County regions combine newly-created management teams of professionals,
such as a regional judge, supporting staff, team leader, and court
coordinator. Each team handles a particular family's issues from
"beginning to end, including interviewing, screening, recommending alternatives, investigating and monitoring."333 A sophisticated
reorganization tool, the Family Automated Case Tracking System,
coordinates case management efforts and provides vital information on a family's case history to each team.334
One conclusion derived from this ground-breaking project in
Monmouth County is that the one-judge, one-family concept may
not be viable in practice. This project suffers from a lack of judicial
resources and skilled personnel necessary to meet the needs of
families. Adoption of a UFC approach would require additional
judicial resources to reduce judicial burnout and to relieve the
stress placed on a lone judge assigned to a community. Furthermore, regional teams would require specific training and abilities
to be fully effective, including excellent communication and problem-solving sldls."'
Another pilot project, which was created in Deschutes County,
Oregon, resulted in findings that differ from those of the Monmouth County project. Data from the Deschutes County project
support a court-imposed UFC.336 Finding that greater family input
encourages success, the Deschutes County project positively concluded that a UFC results in resource sharing, creative problem
solving, and early intervention strategies for families. The
Deschutes County UFC experience reported decreased duplication
of services and increased effectiveness of treatment plans.337
331. Id. at 60.
332. Id.
333. Court Coordination,supra note 319, at 60.

334. Id.
335. Id.

336. Hon. Stephen N. Tiktin & Ernest J. Mazorol I, Family Court Coordinationof
Human Services, Deschutes County, Oregon, 35 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 342
(July 1997).
337. Id. at 346.
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Other jurisdictions agree that courts need to address family
problems in a preventive fashion "before [families] get into the judicial system."338 The South Carolina UFC demonstrates this direction. The South Carolina Legislature approved a statute creating a
policy for all of the state's children who are in need of services,
including those children with mental, social, emotional, physical,
developmental, cultural, educational, and economic disadvantages
or disabilities. This children's policy also extends to children who
are dependent, neglected, abused, or exploited.339 The South Carolina policy defines the court's jurisdiction and its duties with regard to parent-child relationships and guardianships.3 40 Family
court has exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for divorce, megrandpardiation, adoption, birth certificate correction, contempt,
34'
abuse.
domestic
from
protection
and
ent visitation,
A more recent revision to the South Carolina Code specifically
details a legislative mandate that family court submit both an annual budget and a report to the legislature and executive branches
for review:
To carry out this policy each agency, department, institution, committee, and commission which is concerned or responsible for children
shall submit as a part of its annual budget request a listing of programs
and services for children, the priority order of these programs and services in relation to other services, if any, that are provided by the agency,
department, institution, committee, or commission, and a summary of
the expenses incurred for the administration of its children's services
and programs... [and] an annual report to the General Assembly shall include as part of the report a comprehensive statement of how its children's services and programs contributed to the implementation of this
policy. Copies of all these budget requests and annual reports must be
provided to the Joint Legislative Committee on Children and the Governor's Office by the agency, department, institution, committee, or comS. 342
mission.

In a spirit of cooperation and information sharing, all three governmental branches in South Carolina are participating in the formation and management of a UFC to ensure children's needs are
met.
Judith S. Kaye, Chief Justice of New York's Court of Appeals, is
338. LAURENCE W. DEMUTH, JR., ET AL., FINAL REPORT FROM THE STEERING COMMITTEE

FOR VISION 2020: COLORADO COURTS OF THE FUTURE 63 (1992).
339. 8A S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Law. Co-op.1996).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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currently advocating for both a unified court system and a UFC to
replace New York's "disunified court system."343 The Chief Justice
indicated that, as the New York court system currently exists,
"[y]ou can easily be in the wrong court and, in the case of family
disputes, you can be in several courts."3" New York's need for a
unified system results from the state's current nine-tier court system.34 Chief Justice Kaye proposes to condense nine courts into
two-a supreme court and a district court346 -so that "the consuming public
[may] have a simple, user-friendly, efficient court sys34 7
tem.
On behalf of the state executive branch, New York Governor
George Pataki endorses this proposal for restructuring the courts.
He agrees these efforts would "modernize [the] antiquated system
of trial courts."348 Although revising the state constitution and
drafting necessary amendments will require significant energy, all
are enthusiastic and
three branches of New York state government
" 349
change.
"dramatic
this
about
cooperative
Ohio is also exploring the implementation of a UFC. Recently,
the National Center for Juvenile Justice, after a thorough review of
Ohio's courts, prepared a comprehensive report recommending
methods designed to improve coordination of Ohio's family law
proceedings. 35" The first major recommendation involves the cooperation of all three branches of government-the Supreme
Court of Ohio, the Ohio General Assembly, and the Governor's
Task Force. Implementing this recommendation would create a
family code revision commission, whose duties would consist of
drafting clear, simplified Ohio family law statutes.35 :
An additional recommendation advises the Ohio Supreme Court
343. John Caher, Kaye Gains Ground Where Others Have Stumbled, ALBANY
LEGISLATIVE SURVIVAL GUIDE, Jan. 7, 1998, at 7.

344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. The merger of the supreme court, court of claims, family court, county court,
and surrogate court would result in the new all-purpose supreme court. The merger of
two New York City courts, the criminal and civil courts, as well as city courts and district courts in Nassau and Suffolk counties, would result in a new tribunal known as
district court. Id.
347. 8A S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. HUNTER HURST, ET AL., OHIO FAMILY COURT FEASIBILITY STUDY, FINAL REPORT,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE (1997).

351. Id. at 127.
352. Id.
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to assume a strong leadership role in support of local courts' consolidating family law dockets. This leadership entails appointing
standing committees with pilot site funding, staffing, and site selection powers. The supreme court will need to request additional
resources from the Ohio Legislature-in particular, funding to expand court administration technology, a necessary ingredient for a
UFC.353 Other recommendations include the court's changes to the
manner of scheduling cases so as to more efficiently manage and
monitor family law dockets and to expand foster care networks to
provide stable foster homes.354
As noted above, in October, 1990, the Vermont Legislature created a family court having statewide jurisdiction. Vermont legislators envisioned a non-adversarial UFC in which the courts facilitate communication between the parties so that they can, with the
help of a trained staff, resolve their own disputes. 5 The Vermont
Supreme Court appointed a committee chaired by an associate
justice to further ensure the success of this alternative dispute
resolution process." 6 Families involved in the court system are
encouraged to locate and use community resources.357 Vermont's
goals also include protecting children and adults from abuse and
providing timely court decisions at all stages in the legal process.358
Efficient and effective decision making is consistent with Vermont's aim for continued UFC success, in part demonstrated by
facilitating alternative non-adversarial methods for resolving family related matters. So necessary is such direction that the Vermont
Supreme Court incorporated the following within the special experimental procedures:
[W]hether granting parties the ability to choose non-adversarial alternative procedures in divorce and parentage actions, and whether granting
judges discretionary authority to take action to enable the parties or the
court to make better informed decisions while reducing court costs and
delay 35
are
9 effective methods to help the Family Court to accomplish its
goals.

353. Id. at 128.
354. Id.
355. Lee Suskin, Developing a Model in Washington County for a Family Oriented
Court: Proposed Experimental Rules for Family Proceedings, (working draft, Mar. 21,
1994) [hereinafter Developing a Model].
356. Id. at 1.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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In a more comprehensive statutory framework, the Vermont
Legislature recently promulgated revised procedures to effectuate
the statewide family court by authorizing the supreme court to
"make and promulgate rules governing practice, procedure and
administration in the family court."360 Under the system, family
court employees became state employees subject to the supreme
court's appointment, removal, and compensation powers. The
court administrator is statutorily authorized to "increase the compensation of county clerks who are assigned additional duties and
responsibilities in the family or district courts, consistent with the
pay scale of district and superior court clerks."36
The Vermont Legislature has vested family court with "all of the
equitable and other powers of the superior court as to civil matters
within its jurisdiction except as specifically limited by statute."362
The legislature also specifically permits this court of record to
possess "the same power over its judgment, records and proceedings as that vested in the superior courts... and may exercise in
connection therewith all the powers of courts of record at common law."363
Family court is also vested with exclusive jurisdiction over requests to modify or enforce orders, including those issued by the
district or superior courts.3 " These orders involve an array of family issues, including desertion, support, paternity, married women's
rights, support enforcement, annulment, divorce, grandparent visitation, uniform child custody, juvenile protective services, mental
health, involuntary sterilization, abuse prevention (except for
emergency relief, which is permitted by any district or superior
judge),5 abuse and exploitation of minors, and emancipation of mi36
nors.
Vermont's statutory scheme for probate court permits guardianship and adoption matters to be transferred from probate court to
family court. This statute also authorizes family court to transfer
probate proceedings that have many parties, issues, and evidence
so similar in nature to the parties, issues, and evidence in pending
family court cases. Such a transfer must be intended to expedite

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 451(a) (1997).
Id. at § 452(b) (1997).
Id. at § 453.
Id. at § 453(b).
Id. at § 454 (Supp. 1997).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 454 (Supp. 1997).
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issue resolution "or... [to] best serve the interests of justice."3 66 As
regards appellate jurisdiction, the Vermont Supreme Court is
vested with sole jurisdiction to decide family court appeals.367
Other important matters addressed by Vermont's statute include
the participation and availability of assistant judges, descriptions
of their duties, and procedures relating to family court. Although
one presiding judge and two assistant judges normally preside
over family court, the statute includes a procedural framework
addressing situations in which only one assistant judge is
available.368 Jurisdiction of magistrates and findings of contempt
are specifically authorized, as well as jurisdiction over child support matters. When a temporary order exists or is contemplated,
family court may exercise jurisdiction if its proceeding is more
3 69
expeditious than would be a proceeding before a magistrate.
This statute also entitles parties or legal entities to legal counsel.370
Washington County, Vermont, has also experimented with rules
regulating family proceedings.371 The local courts have promulgated rules to advance a non-adversarial divorce procedure by establishing new divorce formats, alternative procedures, pleadings,
temporary orders, discovery, mediation, and a right to legal representation.37 These rules aim "to create a new model for people
who wish to end their marriage in a manner which minimizes hoshonors their wishes to meet the needs of their
tilities and which
373
entire family[.]"
By advancing these experimental rules, the courts recognize the
destructive impact of anger on a family unit during a divorce. The
courts benefit separated spouses and their children by maling
available counseling and treatment designed to manage the anger
within the family. By managing this anger and working together,
the parties in a divorce bring closure to the marital relationship,
permitting them to restructure their relationship in a positive manner, which is of particular importance when the parental relationship will continue.37 4 Litigants invoking procedures under these
366. Id. at § 455.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at § 456.
Id.
Id. at § 461-63.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 464 (Supp. 1997).
Developing a Model, supra note 355.
Id. at 2-7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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rules are provided incentives that are not available under a traditional, fragmented court still operating on the adversarial model:
any "potential financial gain or enhanced parenting role [a party]
may obtain through litigation is not 375
worth the emotional pain that
an adversarial divorce might inflict."

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

According to professors, judges, lawyers, and government personnel comprising the Pennsylvania Futures Commission, trends
that affecting justice for children and families include illegitimacy,
surrogacy, poverty, abuse/violence, substance abuse, and effect of
welfare.376 The commission found that addressing social, economic, and legal issues that affect the family requires society to
"take a special interest in its children." 377 This task force envisions
that, in the near future, courts will incorporate the following into
their systems: a separate family court having specially trained
judges; judicial participation in organizing the system and selecting
(and prescribing the role of) other professionals; alternative dispute resolution, facilitated by trained dispute resolution professionals; equitable, efficient, timely resolution of family disputes;
and custody determinations by professionals that do not involve
traditional litigation.378
In 1995, the Pennsylvania Futures Commission proposed to
"create a system that satisfies the public's belief that the system
will protect its rights." 379 The commission's intent is to accomplish
consumer satisfaction within the justice system through education,
training, and introduction of multiple levels of dispute
resolution.38 The overall goal is to encourage alternative dispute
resolution
and to instill public trust for a multicultural fabric of
381
society.
Public trust depends on the leaders of each governmental
branch. Unfortunately, tensions exist among the branches, causing
delay in monetary allocations required to achieve necessary goals
375. Id.
376. STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION ON JUSTICE IN THE
21ST CENTURY 24 (1995).

377. Id. at 7.
378. Id. at 7.
379. Id.

380. Id. at 1.
381. STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION ON JUSTICE IN THE

21ST CENTURY 24 (1995) (appended draft vision statement).

1998

Proposal for a Statutory Unified Family Court

for improved justice within the courts. The Pennsylvania Legislature is considering the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's initial request of $15 million dollars in Governor Tom Ridge's budget prosum covers administrative personnel salaries and exposal. This 382
only.
penses
The total costs for a unified court are estimated at between $300
million and $1 billion.3 83 Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
repeated rulings that the commonwealth is responsible for funding
the courts, legislators remain leery as to the state court's ability to
best manage or "watchdog" over the system.3 84 This sentiment is
expressed by State Senator Jeffrey E. Piccola, among others; although he favors the $15 million request, Senator Piccola has concerns regarding the return the legislature will receive from the
courts for "a billion dollar takeover of our county courts."3 85 He
states, "if the state court would work with the Legislature, not order it around, and stop using its rule-making powers to invalidate
state laws, lawmakers would be more amenable."386 Thus, the legislative branch is indicating that bargaining among the governmental branches would "achieve a reduction in tensions between the
branches of government."387 Legislators believe that the plan for
the unified court system, which is intended to be phased in by infurther in terms of long-term procrements, needs to be explained
88
consequences.1
jections and
This expressed lack of certainty and confidence in the state
court's ability to manage a unified state court budget can be disappointing and mystifying to the judiciary. Today's judges receive
top-notch training through continuing education, as illustrated by
Pennsylvania's New Judges' School for newly appointed and
elected judges. Other well-structured and well-presented educational seminars and conferences are conducted by judges and professors for state3 89trial judges with the support of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.

382. Peter DeCoursey, Takeover of Courts Inches Forward,THE HARRISBURG
Dec. 11, 1997, at Bll.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

PATRIOT,

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DeCoursey, supra note 382, at Bll.
Id.

389. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has hired former judge Thomas C. Raup as Consultant of Court-related Education. See DIRECTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONFERENCE OF
STATE TRIAL JUDGES 1997-1998, at 10.
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Pennsylvania is not alone when it recognizes that court management is a necessary component for its justice system, providing
professional, reliable, and consistent assistance to court-related
procedures and work.39° Given the reductions in federal funding,
each of Pennsylvania's county courts has become even more vigilant and conscious of budgetary expenditures for the sake of local
taxpayers.
Judges in local courts are working with their local executive
governmental leaders to create resource management teams to
recommend appropriate but affordable juvenile placements. Local
courts, such as the Erie courts under the leadership of President
Judge John A. Bozza, have collaborated with other entities-including the Erie city school district; the office of children and
youth, juvenile probation; and Perseus House juvenile treatment
center-to create a community-based treatment program that enables juveniles to remain in the community while they are receiving treatment. This strategy has proven to be economically wise
and cost effective for the entire community of stakeholders.
With county courts striving for and achieving efficiency in their
budgets, "courts are more capable of running their own affairssometimes better than the governments that 'host' them."3 9' As a result, courts are becoming increasingly independent as a "third
branch of government."392 Some may wonder whether this independence is the real reason for the legislature's concern over what
they "get" from budgeting this new, unified court system? Perhaps
this concerns also stems from the uncertainty of a long-term investment for the future of a unified judicial system, but the best
predictor of the future is past experience; the legislature should
look to the pilot programs scattered throughout the states that
390. This professionalism of court management, as well as its value to the efficient
work of court systems, is illustrated by the volumes of books and courses available
currently. In fact, the American Bar Association has established standards relating to
court organization and administration. One such standard emphasizes the need for an
administrative office of the courts, with appropriate assistance from outside experts, to
utilize a cost-benefit analysis approach regarding technological innovation. For instance, one of the steps in these standards suggests the administrative officer inventory
and evaluate alternative approaches and technology. This is accomplished by analyzing
"suitability, strengths and weaknesses, estimated value of anticipated benefit (both
short- and long-term), such as greater efficiency and effectiveness in case processing
and disposition and improved public service. ABA Judicial Administrative Division,
STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, 133-34 (1990 ed.).
391. Clement Bezold, On Futures Thinking and the Courts, THE CT. MANAGER, Sum-

mer 1991, at 9.
392. Id.
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have implemented successful UFCs. A unified judicial system incorporating a statewide UFC would represent progress in a true
economic fashion.
Although the future of the courts is uncertain, one gains an enhanced sense of the court's ability to deal with, understand, and
manage its own future through tools such as trends, scenarios, visions, and strategies.393 The courts, especially those in Pennsylvania, have examined this dilemma, as is evidenced by the Pennsylvania's Futures Commission's planning for the future. "One judgeone family" is a vehicle to assure the legislature of the welltargeted, goal-oriented direction of the courts. A statutory proposal
for a statewide UFC empowers the legislature to take ownership of
the system's eventual success.394
When a statewide UFC system has been implemented, the legislature will "get something," so to speak, from their multimillion
dollar investment and the courts, in turn, will have proven their
ability to "give something." The legislature and the courts both act
responsibly by creating a UFC, and the legislature retains control
of a substantial portion of necessary funding of the general unified
judicial system budget. In the future, the legislature can take credit
for achieving a more efficient, yet cost-efficient, unified court
structure within each legislative district.
The legislature can revitalize public trust by adopting a statutory
UFC system to establish and maintain public confidence in all
three governmental branches.395 The judiciary's leadership in improving the family court system would actually realize the "independence, power and finances that the tripartite theory of American government implies."3 96 This team approach to governing
would establish an excellent example for the family to model.
Moreover, as shown by efforts to implement a UFC, the courts are
even better prepared to maintain and justify public confidence. By
implementing a UFC, the courts create a long-range plan for society's most basic unit-the family.
Pennsylvania's legislature should draft and approve statutory
language similar to that of Vermont's UFC statute. This legislative
action will promote cooperation between the branches, as demonstrated by the New York Legislature's support for the New York
393. Id. at 5.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 11.
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court system's efforts to unify that state's courts. A UFC will provide efficient and effective services to all citizens, especially families and youth. Pennsylvania has already implemented programs
such as balanced restorative justice, resource management teams,
and alternative dispute resolution, each of which is consistent with
a UFC for Pennsylvania.
The legislature may be hesitant to create a UFC under the complete control of the courts. However, a UFC statute will provide
the accountability and competency the legislature requires to be
assured of the many economic benefits to be derived for their constituents. Just as litigants in family court gain incentives under
UFC systems, so, too, do legislators.
A statutory proposal for a statewide UFC will fulfill the needs of
Pennsylvania families while empowering the branches of government with opportunities to succeed in unifying a fragmented family court system, as well as properly placing the UFC's management within the purview of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Under the umbrella of a unified judicial system, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has diligently and patiently attempted to prod the legislature to meet its constitutional court-funding mandate. A statewide UFC will finally fulfill this mandate.
Trial court judges need to promote implementing the concept of
a statewide UFC, because judges are reform initiators and the
greatest resource for improving the courts.397 Incentives exist to
change fragmented family, orphans', and juvenile courts into a
statewide UFC. The rewards of consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness will be substantial for courts and for the community of
consumers they serve. A UFC is one response to the issue of how
to implement a unified court generally. It makes good "economic"
sense.

397. Jennifer Adams Mastrofski, Family Court Reform in Six Pennsylvania Counties,
29 FAM. & CONCIL. CTS. REV. 129, 149 (1991).

